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
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OUR JAPANESE FOE

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G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

NEW YORK

OUR JAPANESE FOE

BY

IAN MORRISON



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NEW YORK

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{ PART I }

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I.

THIS BOOK, written in the leisure intervals of the life of a war correspondent, sets out to answer three questions.

1. How did the conflict in the Far East arise and what is its true nature?
2. How is Japan to be defeated?
3. What principles in the post-war world are going to determine the attitude of the Allies towards Japan and towards the various problems of the Far East?

Very briefly it seeks to state some of the problems and to suggest some solutions.

Much thought is being expended in England on the problems that will confront us in Europe after the war. Less is being expended on the problems, equally grave, perhaps even more complicated, that will confront us in Asia.

We often say that the war is global. But few of us appreciate the full extent of this globality. It is difficult for any one whose existence is directly threatened to achieve the necessary detachment. Thus for people in England the European facet of the world struggle looms largest on their horizon. They are directly threatened by Nazi Germany. Japan is still only a distant and indirect threat. But, if England is preoccupied primarily with Germany, some of her Allies are preoccupied primarily with Japan, and others divide their preoccupation equally between Germany and Japan. More than 430,000,000 Chinese think of Japan as a prime menace. So do 8,000,000 Australians and New Zealanders. On the course of the war against Japan hangs the fate of 380,000,000 Indians, 60,000,000 Indonesians, 14,000,000 Burmese. The Americans

are threatened by Germany on one flank and by Japan on the other. So are the Russians, despite the temporary truce which exists on their eastern flank.

The war is global in the sense that there is not room in the same world for the Allied and Axis systems. It will avail us nothing if we defeat Nazi Germany and leave Japan in undisputed control of Asia and the Pacific. In the East the Allies are not fighting primarily to preserve their colonial possessions, or to gain new possessions, or even to deprive Japan of her colonial possessions. They are fighting to decide whether Asia, and the rest of the world, is in future to be organized on an Axis or an Allied pattern. So fundamental are the differences between these two patterns that constant strife is inevitable until one is completely eliminated.

But—and many people make this mistake—the war is not global in the sense that the military defeat of one of the Axis powers will automatically bring about the defeat of the other. Japan is not a subsidiary appendage of Germany, which, when the parent organism is destroyed, will wither and die of its own accord. The Japanese do not count upon a German victory in Europe. They did not count on one, although they thought one was likely, when they attacked Pearl Harbor. It goes without saying that a German victory in Europe, or even a stalemate, would be enormously to the advantage of Japan. But the leaders of Japan are prepared against the day when Germany is defeated. They are prepared to meet the combined and concentrated might of the Allied nations. Japan is not an Italy. She is a nation on the same military scale as Nazi Germany. Japan, no less than Germany, will have to be defeated on the military plane. Japanese ships will have to be sunk, Japanese planes will have to be shot down out of the skies, Japanese armies will have to be driven back on fields of battle, Japanese armament factories will have to be bombed. These things cannot be done without heavy loss of life. The price of victory in Asia will not be a light one.

It is possible that in one important respect Japan is a more

formidable opponent than Germany. Her morale, both civilian and military, is less brittle.

In regard to her civilian morale, there is little basis in fact for the widely-held theory that the bombing of Japanese cities will cause national collapse. Bombing may achieve this end by dislocating the national economy. But the people would probably react to aerial bombardment with the same toughness of fiber with which in the past they have always reacted to the natural disasters which periodically vex their country. The Spanish Civil War suggested that the initial effect of mass bombing was panic; that the second and lasting effect, especially on a virile people, was an intensification of hatred and a strengthening of resolve. The last three years have borne out that experience. Italy is a country which might be taken out of the war by bombing. That is because the hearts of the people are not really in the war. But there is no reason to suppose that the peoples of Germany and Japan will behave any differently from the peoples of Britain, China and Russia.

In regard to Japanese military morale, perhaps we sometimes overestimated it when we had our first taste of fighting the Japanese. But it was the unanimous experience of the Australians who fought in Papua, the only Allied troops who have fought against the Germans and Italians as well as against the Japanese, that the Japanese continued to fight doggedly on in circumstances where the Germans and the Italians would have surrendered long before.

This assertion may be illustrated by one example from the Papuan campaign, that bitter and bloody little war which had more in common with the war between Bolivia and Paraguay in the Gran Chaco than with any other campaign of recent years.

In the middle of November, 1942, the remnants of the army commanded by Lieutenant-General Tomitaro Horii (who was himself drowned when trying to escape down the Kumusi river) were finally confined at three points on the north Papuan coast, Gona, Sanananda and Buna. The garrison

at Gona was the smallest of the three. It consisted of perhaps 1,000 men when the Japanese first took up their positions there. Although it was the first of the three points to be liquidated, it was not an easy job. The Japanese were gradually pushed further and further back until they were confined, with their backs to the sea, in an area perhaps 600 yards long and 350 yards deep. They took up well-chosen positions with prepared fields of fire and dug themselves in under the native huts of the village and at the bases of large trees. Many of their dug-outs were roofed with logs which rendered them impervious to mortar fire.

The fighting was hard enough for the Australians. Those superb troops had fought their way right across the island, across the jungle-covered ranges of the Owen Stanley mountains. They lived on biscuits and bully-beef and tea. They were oppressed by malaria, by scrub typhus, by dysentery, by jungle sores, by filthy itches, especially round the ankles. They lay in shallow rifle pits during the day, basted by a tropical sun. When the showers came, the pits filled with water. They were living in a way which even the Papuan natives disdained. But the fighting was even harder for the Japanese. All the conditions of fighting which applied to the Australians applied to them too. Furthermore they were bombarded continuously, by mortars and twenty-five-pounders. Flying Fortresses dropped demolition, fragmentation and delayed-action bombs on them. Bostons and Beaufighters strafed them. Bostons dropped parachute bombs on them. Wirraways divebombed them. They were completely cut off from any line of communication. They must have known that there was no possibility of help or reinforcement. They could not evacuate their wounded. They were forgotten men.

They were not able to bury their dead. Or perhaps, such was their state of desperation, they did not bother to bury their dead. The corpses caused an appalling stench, that unique and horrible stench of rotting human flesh. In the tropics a corpse begins to smell after only a few hours. The stench drifted

across to the Australians on the perimeter and nauseated them. The day before the Japanese garrison tried to break out of the tightening Australian ring, it was reported that Japanese had been seen moving about wearing gas-masks, trying to get away from that dreadful smell.

Nevertheless they refused all invitations to surrender. Finally on the night of December 8, on the eve of the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, they tried to break out to the southeast in an attempt to reach the garrison further down the coast near Sanananda. They were mowed down in the darkness by Bren guns. The next day the Australian forces killed the remainder of the garrison, except for a few men who were so badly wounded or so ill that they could not fight and they were taken prisoner. Even when the Australians had occupied all the coastline small groups in clumps of trees would not surrender but continued to fire their weapons.

When the Australians came to examine the Japanese positions, they wondered how any human beings could have endured such vile conditions. Rotting bodies, sometimes weeks old, formed part of the fortifications. The living fired over the bodies of the dead, slept side by side with them. In one trench was a Japanese who had not been able to stand the strain. His rifle was still pointed at his head, his big toe was on the trigger, the top of his head was blown off. There were scenes at Gona which exceeded anything I saw subsequently at Buna or Sanananda, scenes which I hope I shall never see again. Everywhere, pervading everything, the stench of putrescent flesh.

The reaction of the Australian soldiers was interesting. There was no admiration or respect for this behavior of the Japanese. They were completely puzzled. They could not understand how human beings could have stood this filth and stench. Germans and Italians, they said, would have surrendered long ago, would have surrendered honorably.

It is morale of this kind that we are up against in the case of the Japanese, a desperate, almost animal, ferocity. Let us bear this quality in mind when we think of the war against

Japan. The liquidation of Japanese armies and garrisons by physical force will be no easy task. We are confronted in Japan, not only by a military power, but also by a spiritual and psychological power, of great force.

It is interesting to look back over the centuries of Japanese history, and, braving the superficiality necessarily imposed by the brief compass of this book, to note some of the strands which went to the creation of such a formidable military power, such a formidable national psychology.

2.

Three strains blended, in the dawn of history, to form this island race. The earliest inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago were the Ainu, now a dwindling race confined to Hokkaido and the southern Kurile Islands. They are related to the Tungusic tribes of eastern Siberia and also possess distant Aryan affinities. Hunters and fishers, they lost out in the struggle with the immigrant cultivators, who required infinitely less territory in order to sustain a much larger population. Rice, incidentally, which became the staple food of these cultivators, supports a greater density of population than any other crop. The second strain is the Mongoloid. Men of Chinese origin, driven eastward by the pressure which has sent wave after wave of peoples moving eastward across the face of China, passed down the Korean peninsula, crossed the straits and reached the islands. But the third and dominant strain in the Japanese racial make-up is a Malay strain. Men of southern origin drifted up by way of Formosa and Ryu Kyu eventually to settle in these northern islands. Warm, passionate, southern blood still flows in the veins of the Japanese. These people of southern origin lost in their new home the indolence and incapacity for sustained effort which characterizes nearly all the peoples of southern Asia, qualities begotten by the tropical climate and by the ease with which life can be supported in the tropics. The colder climate of Japan, and the continual natural disasters to which its in-

habitants were exposed—earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, great floods—bred a hardiness and a vigor which the Japanese people still possess.

This blending took place in the dawn of history. Already, when the Japanese first appeared on the stage of world history, they were a distinctive racial unit. But the southern, the Malay, strain continued to be dominant. It is this that distinguishes the Japanese so fundamentally from the Chinese, and partly causes the misunderstandings which arise between the two peoples, despite the superficial affinities which derive largely from the past cultural influence of China on Japan. A Japanese looks very much more like a Malay or a Thai or a Burman than like a Chinese. He has the same capacity for sudden outbursts of violence or fanaticism. He has something of the fire of the south, something too of the volcanic heat which smolders beneath the soil of his native land.

There was evolved in Japan during the course of the centuries a distinctive culture, which was in constant process of development, but which from earliest times to the present has possessed certain outstanding characteristics. Chief of these characteristics were a sublimation of the martial virtues and a delicate sensibility to the works both of nature and of art.

Until she set out to modernize herself in the second half of the last century, Japan had been organized on a clan basis. The Imperial House of Japan is undoubtedly the oldest ruling house in the world, although the line of inheritance has not always passed directly from father to son. But the Emperor then, as now, tended to be elevated above the arena of politics and power. He was a high-priest rather than a ruler, an incarnation in human and visible form of the spirit of the country. In his name the country was ruled by a *shogun*, or military dictator. This regent controlled the *daimyo*, the feudal lords, who were the heads of the various clans. Each *daimyo* had a small private army, composed largely of the *samurai*, or knights, who were bound to their lords by the closest ties of loyalty and devotion. Then there were three classes of *heimin*, or commoners,

the farmers, the artisans and the traders. Highest in popular estimation of these three classes were the farmers, who provided the basis on which the economy of the country rested. A farmer when on his own land might even wear one sword. Then came the artisans who included artists and painters. Lowest in estimation were the traders who were somewhat despised since the *samurai* considered money and trade ignoble and debasing. (This is the chief reason why Japanese commercial integrity in the early days of foreign intercourse in the last century was not of a high order. The best elements in the country still looked down upon commerce and would not take part in it.) There was also a class of untouchables, the *eta*, who performed tasks, like the slaughtering of animals and the execution of criminals, which were socially necessary but which ran counter to the Buddhist injunction against taking life.

The farmers and peasants toiled in their fields, the artisans labored at their multifarious crafts, the traders bought and sold in the cities and often indeed amassed considerable wealth. The feudal lords, however, and their armed retainers lived in a condition of intermittent warfare. From time to time wars swept up and down the country. New *shoguns* rose to power by force of arms and established hereditary dynasties which in their turn would be challenged by new aspirants to power and eventually overthrown. *Daimyos*, or groups of *daimyos*, would carry on bloody feuds with their neighbors or with other groups. Personal vendettas would persist through generations. *Ronins*, or knights who for one reason or another had lost their allegiance to their lords, roamed up and down the country leading a cutthroat bandit life.

There was evolved a code of ethics, a philosophy of life, which glorified the virtues of the warrior. The warrior virtues were universally esteemed. The virtue prized above all others was that of loyalty, loyalty unswerving and untarnished, loyalty ready at a moment's notice for the supremest sacrifice. In feudal days it was loyalty to the Emperor that was stressed, or loyalty to the *daimyo*, loyalty in the sacred bond of friend-

ship. In more modern times that loyalty has been transferred to "Japan," and to the Emperor as the living symbol of "Japan."

Religious systems were developed or imported. The early animistic beliefs were elaborated in the various sects of *Shinto*. At a later date one form of *Shinto* became an official nationwide patriotic cult. Buddhism reached Japan in the sixth century by way of Korea, enjoyed a tremendous vogue, and exerted a lasting and profound influence on ways of thought and feeling. Japanese traveled all the way to India to bring back the sacred texts. (It is interesting to note in passing that Buddhism spread, not like Christianity through the militant missionary efforts of its adherents, but through its own prestige, which brought seekers after truth from distant countries like Japan.) Christianity reached Japan in the middle of the sixteenth century. Portuguese and Spanish missionaries soon acquired a widespread following. Christianity, after being officially banned for two and a half centuries, again began to assert its influence in the second half of the last century.

But these religious and philosophical systems, native and imported, have never affected the status of the warrior and the esteem in which the warrior virtues were held. The supreme expression of the Japanese ethos, equivalent to the story of Jesus in Christian countries, or the legend of the Niebelungs in Germany, is a bloody tale of revenge. The forty-seven *ronins*, after undergoing great privations and hardships, at last avenged in blood their master, the Lord of Ako, who had been disgraced and obliged to commit *harakiri*. Oishi Kuranosuke and his comrades then committed *harakiri* themselves. Still to this day sticks of incense burn before their tombs. The tales of renunciation of Jesus and Gautama made little appeal to the imaginations of the vehement, passionate dwellers in the Japanese archipelago. In modern Japan it is the great soldiers and sailors, like General Nogi and Admiral Togo, who are venerated, not the great statesmen or thinkers. Nogi is chiefly venerated because, as the funeral cortege of his master, the Emperor Meiji,

was leaving the precincts of the Imperial Palace, he and his wife committed suicide together. Still, in twentieth century Japan, the popular stage devotes itself to rambunctious, sword-rattling, classical melodramas, which in spirit, and also largely in presentation, recall the bloodthirsty melodramas of Marlowe and the early Elizabethans. Papers and magazines carry serials dealing with times and themes similar to those of Robin Hood or the Knights of the Round Table. One of the most prominent statues in Tokyo commemorates the action of three Japanese soldiers who, in the fighting at Shanghai in 1932, formed themselves into a sort of human bomb in an attempt to blast a way through some barbed-wire entanglements. Political assassins have more than once become popular idols because, to Japanese ways of thinking, they showed a spirit of sacrifice. Their crimes were held to have been justified by the sincerity of their motives.

It is impossible to understand the causes of the present conflict in the Far East without appreciating the tradition of warfare and the estimation of the warrior virtues which have always prevailed in Japan.

3.

Side by side with the tradition of warfare there developed a remarkable culture marked by a most delicate artistic sensibility.

Nature has enriched with beauty and variety the archipelago of Japan as she has enriched few other portions of the globe. Japan proper is composed of several hundred small islands, of which four—Honshu, Hokkaido, Eyushu and Shikoku—are larger than the others. Nine-tenths of the land area is mountainous, and signs of volcanic activity are everywhere evident. Active volcanoes like Asama-yama, dead volcanoes like Fuji-no-yama, vast craters like that of Aso-san in Kyushu, are dotted all over the archipelago. There is a great profusion of hot springs and, as has been noted already, those other volcanic phenomena occur frequently—earthquakes, eruptions, tidal

waves. The climate varies between two extremes, in summer a heat of considerable violence, in winter, snow and frost and cold. The coldness of the winters preserves the vigor of the people, which might well evaporate if the sun were always to beat down as fiercely as it does in summer.

The landscape does not possess the grandeur, the infinitude, of the great plains and mountain ranges of China, but it has a perfection and a delicacy which only those who have roamed through the country, on foot or on horseback, can know. The impress of man's personality is never long absent. But nature and man are not in Japan, as they are so often in Europe, seemingly antagonistic. Some of the big cities, admittedly, are as ugly and sprawling as the worst that we have in the West. But they are comparatively rare, and, over most of the country, the works of man seem to blend harmoniously into those of nature. The village shrine, for example, is located usually in a *nemus*, or sacred grove, the abode of spirits, a spot hallowed by antiquity, and the simple wooden structure seems indeed to have become a part of the grove.

It is impossible in a single paragraph to describe the landscape of Japan. It possesses still many of the characteristic features that can be seen, in that delightful historical document, Hiroshige's "53 Views of the Tokaido," portraying traffic on the old highway that linked Kyoto, the residence of the Emperor, with Tokyo, the residence of the *Shogun*. It is a landscape which makes up in variety what it lacks in grandeur, in intimacy what it lacks in infinitude, satisfying perhaps the eye rather than the soul.

The reaction to their surroundings of the people who found themselves living in this northern archipelago produced during the course of the centuries, in all the different fields of art, a culture of which any nation might be proud. It is a culture marked not by any great profundity of thought, for the Japanese are not profound thinkers, but by an exquisite sensibility to nature, stressing all the time man's significance as a part of his natural surroundings, not as a thing detached from them. I have

often felt that Japanese poetry, those little verses which express so poignantly the joy or sadness of the moment, is more poetical than any poetry save that of the Irish and the Icelanders. Poetry is still part of the life of the people. Tens of thousands of simple, ordinary people still enter each year for the Imperial Poetry Competitions.

It is the fashion to decry Japanese at the expense of Chinese art. Certainly China exerted a lasting and profound influence on Japan. China's achievements are matchless. For thousands of years China was the mentor of the whole of the Far East. But those who disparage the achievements of the Japanese art and culture as base imitations of Chinese originals simply do not know what they are talking about. The Japanese possess a precious cultural heritage. The early brush paintings can vie with the best that were ever produced in China. The novels of the Heian era, such as the *Genji-no-Monogatari*, are picaresque works of a unique character. The *No* plays have an equally unique character and they are marked, like the Heian novels, by the liveliest aesthetic awareness. In all fields of art—in pottery, in dancing, in calligraphy, in the decoration of screens and fans, in landscape gardening, in horticulture, in the technique of arranging flowers, in the many different forms of Japanese music, in the remarkable puppet drama of Osaka, in the popular classical drama called *Kabuki*, in the cult of the tea ceremony, in domestic and religious architecture, in women's dress—in all these fields, whatever may have been the inspiration or the influence of China, the Japanese carried the old forms to a high pitch of further development, while at the same time they discovered for themselves new forms of feeling and expression. The whole Japanese way of life—the woven mats on the floor, the charcoal braziers, the beds which are produced from a cupboard in the wall and spread on the floor, the wooden bath full of boiling water, the alcove which is allowed to contain just one hanging scroll, one ornament and one arrangement of flowers; the sliding paper doors opening on a little ornamental garden, the part played by Emptiness,

the spotless cleanliness—is something unique and something beautiful.

Japan's most remarkable achievement during the past ninety years has been this. While accepting the industrialism of the West, her people have contrived to retain the old habit of artistic awareness, the old tradition of craftsmanship. As Arnold Toynbee has pointed out in one of his books, industrialism in Japan has not caused the same spiritual impoverishment that it has caused in the West. It seems impossible to us that these spectacled Japanese, whom we have sometimes seen in our cities, shuffling along in their ill-fitting western clothes, should have the capacity to be moved to tears by a short poem of eighteen syllables or by the sight of the new moon shining over the roof-tops as they return to their homes in the evening. But such is often the case. Certain artistic traditions, that of flower arrangement, for example, and the habit of making pilgrimages to beautiful places, to see the cherry-trees in bloom or the red autumn leaves of the Japanese maple or some waterfall, these traditions and habits still persist among the common people, and are indeed encouraged by the authorities. The *geisha* play an important role in Japanese life as the guardians of many of these traditions. They are the professional entertainers, the dancers of the old dances, the singers of the age-old songs and ballads.

I have dwelt on this part of Japanese life because it is a mistake to imagine that in the Japanese we are confronted with an adversary who has no cultural heritage and no record of past artistic achievement. Japanese culture has been neither less nor greater in stature than that of a country like England. It has merely been different in kind. If the influence of China in the early days, and of the West more recently, has been great, it has been no greater than that of Palestine, of Greece, of Imperial Rome, of Renaissance Italy, of eighteenth century France, has been at various times in England. No true culture is ever entirely original. It stems from other cultures, and in its turn helps to mold new cultures. There is a difference be-

tween susceptibility to extraneous influence and slavish imitation. Even where Japan has attempted slavishly to imitate, the native temperament has always modified the original and has stamped the new product with an indelible "Made in Japan."

4.

The present is inescapably bound up with the past. An understanding of the early relations between Japan and China, which were those of disciple and revered master, help us to understand their present relations. The Japanese in the sixth and seventh centuries, when Chinese influence first reached their country, felt themselves to be barbarians, as also did many of the other peoples who were living on the fringe of China. They did not even have a means of committing their language to writing. Civilization, wisdom, truth, beauty, they felt, were only to be found in the great but remote empire that existed on the mainland. Students therefore were sent to China to master the new arts. Chinese and Korean artists and priests and philosophers were accorded an eager welcome in Japan. Until the impact of the West, which came in full force only during the second half of the last century, China was the paramount influence in the culture of Japan, in her religious life, and in her thought. This cultural predominance of China engendered a sense of inferiority which for many centuries the Japanese humbly accepted. The time came, however, when this sense of inferiority began to irk them and they wished, perhaps only subconsciously, to shake it off. Later, Japanese nationalism in the political and military spheres begat, and was closely identified with, nationalism in the cultural sphere as well. It has been a factor in recent relations between Japan and China. At the beginning of the China war in the summer of 1937 there were frequent articles in the Japanese press to the effect that for thousands of years Japan had sat at the feet of China, that the time had now come for China to learn from Japan.

Exactly the same thing happened in the case of Japan's contacts with the West, although in this case the sense of inferiority which resulted was far more pronounced. The first white men to reach Japan were the Portuguese and Spanish missionaries in the middle of the sixteenth century. They had a considerable success, partly because the Japanese have an inherent love of novelty and at that time had a tradition of welcoming strangers from afar, partly because the people to whom they preached thought that Christianity was merely some new sect of Buddhism, since many of its rites were similar. The missionaries were followed by Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch merchants. (To show that the Japanese genius for exploitation is no new thing, it is perhaps worth recalling the incident in which three Portuguese were shipwrecked in 1542 on a small island off the coast of Kyushu. One of them had a blunderbuss. The local *daimyo*, who had never seen a firearm before, had the weapon copied, and within a year had a unit of his retainers armed in this fashion. The old Japanese name for a gun was *Tanegashima*, the name of the island on which the three Portuguese were shipwrecked.)

The success of the Spanish and Portuguese missionaries was great while it lasted, but it did not last long. They had found their way into high places, had begun to intrigue against each other, and it was charged against them that they were causing internal difficulties at the *Shogun's* court. A Japanese mission was sent to Italy and the Japanese learned something of the part which Spanish and Portuguese missionaries were accustomed to play in those days as forerunners of colonial enterprise. Early in the seventeenth century, Christianity was banned and the western merchants and missionaries were expelled. Only the Dutch were permitted to continue a limited and somewhat humiliating commerce, but even they were not allowed to set foot on the mainland except when they went to Tokyo to make their obeisance at the *Shogun's* court. They were confined to the little island of Deshima off Nagasaki. Foreigners

of other European nations were not allowed to come to Japan, and Japanese were not allowed to go abroad.

There ensued for Japan a period of almost complete isolation that lasted for more than 220 years. It was not complete, because the Dutch provided a channel of furtive intercourse with the West, and the percolation of western knowledge, arousing among the younger men a desire for more of such knowledge, eventually proved a powerful factor in weakening the whole feudal fabric. But the isolation was almost complete, and this again has had its influence on Japan's relations with other countries in more modern times. During a crucial period of world development, especially in the technological sphere, Japanese civilization was marking time. The impact of the West, when it came, was all the more shattering, and Japan had to accomplish in decades changes which in the West had taken centuries. Moreover, debarred during all this time from intercourse with other nations, the Japanese never had an opportunity to learn, gradually and naturally, the technique of international intercourse. They never saw their country becoming gradually a unit which had to live side by side in the same world with other units. The period of isolation caused a sense of fundamental uniqueness which is one of the most striking features of present-day Japan. Japanese are never tired of dwelling on the uniqueness of Japanese institutions, the uniqueness of the Japanese character, the uniqueness of Japanese achievements, the uniqueness of the role which it is Japan's destiny to play in the world.

When the West eventually knocked at the door of Japan it knocked with the butt of a gun, and it demanded that the door be opened. The opening of Japan to commercial intercourse with the West was bitterly resisted by many elements in the feudal polity. But it was welcomed by other elements, the more progressive, younger, dissatisfied, perhaps slightly frustrated, elements. The more far-seeing Japanese statesmen of the mid-nineteenth century saw that the process was inevitable. They saw furthermore that if their country was to

avoid the fate of colonial subjection which had befallen other eastern peoples they would have to accept the modern technological civilization of the West. They had the spectacle of China before them, that "semi-colonial country" (as Dr. Sun Yat-sen once bitterly called it), whose nominal independence was only maintained by the rivalry of the western powers, busy carving up for themselves spheres of influence.

The feudal organization was eventually overthrown in the middle of the last century and the Imperial power restored. The new leaders, in whose hands now rested the task of guiding the national destiny, set out to transform their country from a feudal into a modern state on the western pattern. Not only did they realize that it was the only means of preserving independence, but there was also a deep-seated desire among many sections of the population for a newer, fresher life, less trammelled by the static rigidity of feudalism. The inherent Japanese love of novelty was also a factor in the situation.

5.

There followed a period of whole-hogging modernization. The institutions, products, techniques of the West were indiscriminately imported. The Imperial House, under a really great ruler, the Emperor Meiji, who ascended the throne in 1867, took the lead in this task of modernization. A liberal constitution was drawn up, somewhat on the Prussian model. A modern navy was built up on the British model, a modern army on the German model. Western medicine and a western system of universal education were adopted and started with the aid of European and American advisers. Western clothes were worn and considered *le dernier cri*. The ban on Christianity was lifted. Missionaries of all countries and all denominations poured into the country. (The Catholic fathers rejoiced to find that some Japanese families, whose forebears had been converted by the early Spanish and Portuguese missionaries, had secretly clung to their faith throughout the period

of isolation. The new religion met with an eager response, on grounds of novelty more often than on grounds of religion. Among the extremer forms taken by this idolization of the West, a movement was even started to substitute English for Japanese as the national language and intermarriage with white men was encouraged in order to increase the stature of the race. Modern factories were set up with the aid of foreign experts, the beginnings of an industrial movement that was later to assume giant proportions. In their admiration for western culture the Japanese temporarily disparaged their own culture. The *daimyo* and *samurai*, whose feudal privileges now counted for less, began to sell their priceless family treasures, an opportunity which a few western connoisseurs did not ignore. Today some of the best collections of Japanese art are to be found in the museums of Boston and London.

In the early days of foreign intercourse there were several incidents in which westerners were cut down by patriotic *samurai* and *ronin* who opposed the opening of their country. But, once the process of westernization had got well under way, the white men were welcomed and revered as repositories of the new knowledge. Complete wasters, washed up on the docks of Kobe or Yokohama, could, and very often did, secure good jobs with the Japanese, then to be venerated as seers and sages, simply by virtue of the pigmentation of their skin.

Three things need to be noticed about this process of westernization. First, it was done with remarkable ability. We may smile at some of the more extreme manifestations of this process. It has given rise to that half-truth, which is repeated parrot-fashion all over the world, that the Japanese are a nation of imitators, incapable of any originality. But it enabled this small island people of the East in less than fifty years to defeat, on the plains of Manchuria, one of the great white powers of the West. In less than sixty years Japan was sitting at the peace tables of Versailles, one of the five great world powers arranging the post-war settlement. In less than eighty-five years her armies had overrun an enormous area on the

mainland of Asia, and occupied in a record space of time the richest purely colonial area in the whole world; her submarines were operating from California to South Africa; her statesmen were proclaiming their nation's leadership in a revolutionary movement aiming at the hegemony of all Asia and the Pacific. And yet less than a hundred years ago Japanese civilization, from the points of view of political organization and technological development, was in the same condition as the England of the sixteenth century. Japan's achievements are not lightly to be dismissed as the achievements of gifted imitators.

Secondly, it must be stressed that it was primarily the weapons and the techniques of the West which Japan adopted, not so much the patterns of thinking and behavior which accompanied those weapons and techniques in the West and which had largely been responsible for evolving them. Japan modified those weapons and techniques just as, many centuries before, she had modified the cultural forms which she imported from China. She carried many of them to further stages of development. Take the textile industry as an example. The Japanese industry, based purely on an imported western technique, early assumed a characteristic Japanese stamp, and, later, Osaka outstripped Lancashire in the up-to-dateness and the efficiency of its methods. Or take the Japanese navy Zero fighter plane. It is a machine based on an imported western technique, yet possessing certain unique features of design which have given it a maneuverability not possessed by any fighter plane by which it has so far been opposed.

The technology of modern Japan is that of the West. But the ideas which underlie that technology are profoundly different. The forms of the West, not the content of those forms, have been imported. The ideas which underlie the technology are often still those of traditional Japan. Hence arise those contrasts and contradictions in Japanese life and in the Japanese character which are a never-ending source of puzzlement to the foreign observer. The Japanese businessman wears coat and trousers at his office during the day, but when he returns

to his home in the evening he dons a kimono and squats on the floor. The Japanese peasant, toiling in his fields, belongs to a Chaucerian age, but huge steel pylons may rise from those same fields carrying power to the factories of Osaka and Nagoya. The Japanese soldier fights with a tommy-gun or a tank, but he feels towards his superior officer much the same passionate loyalty that the two-sworded *samurai* felt towards his feudal lord. The Japanese polity is clothed in the constitutional forms of the West, but it preserves many of the totalitarian ideas of feudal Japan. Western science, developed through an unfettered use of man's questioning intelligence, is taught in the schools, but the foundation of all Japanese education is a theory on the origins of the nation which to many westerners appears to be little more than a fairy story. One section of the people is enthusiastically fond of classical western music, another section is equally fond of classical Japanese music, of which the older forms, such as that played by the musicians of the Imperial Court, is nearer to the music of early China than anything which exists in China today. Modern American films, medieval Japanese melodramas, play to equally crowded houses. Baseball is as popular as are the traditional Japanese exercises of *Kendo*, or fencing, *Judo*, or wrestling, *kyudo*, or archery.

The Japanese racial genius is not a capacity for imitation or even adaptation. It is a capacity for *exploitation*. Count Keyserling, in his "Travel Diary of a Philosopher," has drawn a telling simile. He likens the Japanese genius to the technique of the wrestler in *judo*, who seeks to overcome his opponent, not by exerting his own strength, but by turning his opponent's strength against himself.

Lastly, there is a third characteristic about this process of westernization which must be understood. It has always been told how the cultural influence of China bred a sense of inferiority which Japan eventually sought to shake off. The impact of the West bred exactly the same sense of inferiority. For many years Japan was content to accept the role of

learner. There was indeed something admirable about her attitude. There is always something admirable in the humility of the true learner. But the time came, as it came in the case of China, when this sense of inferiority felt irksome. One reason why the Japanese have been so difficult to deal with during the last few years, both in their personal and in their international dealings, has been the way in which they have oscillated violently between a sense of inferiority and a sense of superiority. A main cause of Japanese nationalism has been an urge to throw off the thralldom of the West and to assert the superiority of Japan, in political, military and cultural fields. Japanese domestic broadcasts, since long before the start of the Pacific war, have dinned incessantly into the ears of the people the superiority of all things Japanese to all things western. It was a thralldom which was largely imagined, but it was none the less potent for that.

6.

Before examining the causes of recent Japanese nationalism, militant and expansionist, I wish to recount very briefly some of the milestones on Japan's path to power. It is a story without parallel in world history.

The breakup of the feudal order and the launching of the new modernized regime were accompanied, as was only to be expected, by great unrest and internal conflict. Some of the great clans, notably those of the west—Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, Hizen—were reluctant to yield up their feudal privileges and the semi-autonomy which they had enjoyed under the *Shoguns*. But as soon as unity had been achieved, and the central power firmly established, Japanese began to turn their attention towards the mainland of Asia. Visionary patriots (of whom there has never been any lack in Japan), dreaming of the future greatness of their country, recalled the exploits of the great national hero, Hideyoshi, who, three centuries before, had led the *samurai* in a war of conquest against Korea. And what did these patriots see when they looked towards the

mainland? They saw the pioneers and colonists of Russia pressing relentlessly east, with always that same goal in view, an ice-free port on the Pacific. At one period in the early nineteenth century, there had even been a danger that the then wild and uncivilized island of Hokkaido would pass under Russian control. Tsarist Russia's eastward drive could not but cause apprehension in the minds of the Japanese. It was a drive that was later renewed under the Soviets.

This fear of Russian encroachment has played a large part in fostering Japanese expansionism on the mainland, from 1875, when several members of the cabinet were in favor of an invasion of Korea, to 1931, when the Japanese Army occupied Manchuria. Such fear still remains. It is even keener now that the long-range bomber has exposed the cities of Japan so vulnerably to aerial attack. The Japanese will never feel secure until they have rolled back the Russian frontier to the Urals.

First of the islands and lands outside Japan to pass into the hands of the Japanese were the Ryu Kyu Islands, south of Kyushu. The king of Ryu Kyu had for centuries led a semi-independent existence, paying tribute either to China or Japan. In 1875 the Japanese Government boldly declared his kingdom a prefecture. The king himself, who was treated quite well, was created a marquis in the Japanese nobility. China made only a *pro forma* protest.

In the same year Japan acquired the Kurile Islands, that chain of islands stretching from Hokkaido to the Kamchatkan peninsula, whose strategic importance, now great, was even then clearly discernible. Japan agreed to recognize Russia's right to the island of Sakhalin if Russia would recognize Japan's right to the Kuriles.

In 1876 Japan proceeded to treat Korea in exactly the same way that America had treated Japan twenty-three years before. A naval force was dispatched to Korea to negotiate a Treaty of Amity. A precedent was set for a form of diplomacy which

Japan has used repeatedly in China, an olive branch in one hand, a large club in the other.

As a result of the treaty three ports were opened to trade with Japan, but difficulties with Korea persisted and they were the chief cause of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894. The Koreans are a distinctive people, very different in appearance and dress both from the Chinese and the Japanese, although they have more in common with the Mongoloid Chinese than with the Japanese. Today they number approximately 23,000,000. They have a high degree of intelligence and a distinctive culture, deriving largely from Chinese originals. For many centuries the king of Korea had paid tribute to China. It was the practice of the Chinese to use this small tributary as a sort of buffer state between China and Japan. They manipulated Korean policy to their own advantage but assumed no responsibility when it brought the Koreans into conflict with the Japanese. A strong antipathy had already developed between the Japanese immigrants into Korea and the people of the country, giving rise to numerous incidents, an antipathy that was encouraged by the Chinese. The unsatisfactory state of this relationship, together with the fear of Russia, which in 1891 had begun to build the Trans-Siberian Railway, made a clash inevitable, and in 1894 Japan launched her attack on Korea. The Chinese forces in Korea were speedily defeated and the Chinese navy crushed in a series of engagements. In the treaty signed at Shimonoseki in 1895 China agreed to recognize the independence of Korea and was forced to cede Formosa and the neighboring Pescadore Islands as well as the southern part of Manchuria. In regard to Manchuria, however, the three European powers of Germany, Russia and France intervened and forced Japan to yield up her gains in that region, an incident that long rankled in the breasts of the Japanese.

Having therefore obtained the Ryu Kyu Islands, the Kuriles, Formosa and the Pescadores, and secured the independence of Korea through a successful appeal to arms, Japan at the

end of the last century was already well launched along the road of imperialism. In 1900, as a result of the part played by Japanese troops in subduing the Boxer rebellion and relieving the beleaguered garrison in Peking, Japan secured the right to station a garrison in the capital of China. For the first time Japanese troops fought side by side with white troops, and distinguished themselves greatly by their bearing and restraint. This participation on grounds of equality with white troops was a source of great satisfaction to the Japanese, especially as it was succeeded by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This alliance, which lasted for nineteen years, was prompted largely by the fear, which both countries felt, of Russia's imperialist policy in the Far East.

The inevitable clash between Russian and Japanese expansion occurred in 1904 and ended in the defeat of the Russians, and the securing by Japan of the Liaotung Peninsula and the southern half of Sakhalin.

In 1910 Korea was quietly annexed and incorporated into the Japanese Empire.

In 1914 Japan entered the Great War on the side of the Allies. She laid siege to Tsingtao, and her navy played a useful if minor part throughout the war. At the Peace Treaty she was awarded a mandate over Germany's former possessions in the Pacific, the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana islands. These islands, which the development of the air arm soon endowed with a valuable strategic significance, were to all intents and purposes incorporated into the Japanese Empire.

Despite Japan's participation in the war against Imperial Germany, there had been no change in her dream of domination in Asia, and in 1915 she took advantage of the preoccupations of the western powers in Europe to present the famous Twenty-one Demands to the Government of Yuan Shih-kai. These demands, if accepted, would have given Japan complete military, political and financial control of China.

In 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria and cut the three northeastern provinces off from the main body of China.

During the next few years, especially in 1935 and 1936, the Japanese army quietly began to press west and southwest from its bases in south Manchuria.

In the summer of 1937 there began a chain of events with which we are all familiar. The Japanese army hoped to nibble off the five northern provinces of China, as it had originally nibbled off Manchuria, as it had more recently nibbled off Inner Mongolia. But China had increased vastly in strength (which was a main reason why Japan went to war at all) and she was in no mood to acquiesce in further aggression on the part of Japan. The war soon spread over the length and breadth of China. Japan, at enormous cost in human life, occupied all the main cities of China, all the main rivers, all the main railways. Her navy blockaded the China coast, her air force laid waste those cities in the interior which remained under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government. But, after four long years, she was still as far from reaching a decision in China as she had been at the beginning, perhaps even farther, for the western powers were giving increased military aid to the Chungking regime.

In the summer of 1940, after the fall of France, Japan took advantage of the collapse of France to impose a treaty on the colonial administration of Indo-China whereby Japanese troops were stationed in Tonkin.

In the summer of 1941 her armed forces occupied south Indo-China, again under a cloak of legality.

In the winter of the same year came the assaults on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, the Netherlands East Indies, the British islands to the north and northeast of Australia.

This short list of dates gives some idea of the speed of Japan's rise to power, of the magnitude and extraordinary nature of her achievement. The inquirer who would really understand this rise to power must read the history of the period in much greater detail. It is a remarkable study, the transformation of a small island people in less than a century

into one of the great world powers. He will perceive that every act of expansion presented itself to the Japanese people in such a way that it appealed, not only to their emotions, but also to their reason. Sometimes the grounds for action strike us western observers as having had a measure of validity, more often as having been completely invalid, but they were always valid in the eyes of the Japanese. Thus the invasion of China in 1937 was presented to the Japanese people largely as a measure of self-defense. Such a line of justification appears absurd to us. But it was accepted by the Japanese without reservations. In war there is always a measure of right on each side, which is sufficient to enable the government of each side to claim a monopoly of right.

7.

The Japanese invasion of China, and the declaration of war on Britain and America, are often ascribed, firstly, to pressure of population, secondly, to economic necessity. Let us consider the first of these two issues.

Anyone who has lived in Japan or passed through it tends to come away with the impression that the country is densely populated. Families always seem to be large and, owing to the system of arranged marriages, there seem to be few unmarried people of either sex in the community. State-provided facilities like primary education, and the paternalism practiced by employers towards their employees, whether in the private home or in the factory, seem to remove from the father of the family many of the responsibilities which might otherwise limit the number of his offspring. The big cities often seem to be pullulantly crowded.

Visual impressions, however, are not completely borne out by statistics. The population of Japan has increased from 33,000,000 in 1873 to over 70,000,000 today. It is a considerable increase, but the rate of increase has not been as rapid as in some of the industrialized countries of the West. The population of England and Wales, for example, is estimated to

have increased about 100 per cent between 1801 and 1851, that of Japan by 78 per cent between 1872 and 1922. Nor at the present time is Japan any more densely populated than some of the western nations. Belgium, for example, is estimated to have 712 inhabitants to the square mile, Holland 686, England and Wales 685, Japan proper 469. Java and Madura are now estimated to have approximately 990.

In feudal times population was held in check by warfare, by disease, and by a limitation in the food-supply which resulted in periodical famines. The first check, warfare, still exists, and has been a potent factor. It is estimated that during the past five years more than 750,000 Japanese have been killed in China alone. But the checks of disease and famine were largely removed by the importation of western science. Science greatly increased the productivity of agriculture inside Japan, and more recently conquest has placed the food reserves of countries like Korea and Indo-China, which have a surplus of rice, at the disposal of Japan.

Although of recent years the population has been increasing steadily, there is evidence that *the rate of fecundity* is dropping. A Japanese expert has estimated that the population will approach stabilization by 1955 at about 80,000,000. Recently the Japanese Government has taken alarm at the population trends and taken various measures to stimulate the birth-rate. Birth-control has been officially discouraged. The breeding of large families has been encouraged as "patriotic." Japan has joined Germany and Italy in presenting to the world the incongruous spectacle of a nation complaining bitterly about the pressure of population, using this alleged pressure as an excuse for all sorts of aggressive policies, and yet at the same time doing all in its power to make the pressure more acute.

It might be thought that the Japanese Government would have tried to relieve this pressure by encouraging or enforcing emigration to Japan's overseas possessions. But even where openings for emigration existed it has not taken place on a large scale.

There are far more Koreans in Japan than there are Japanese in Korea. There has not been any spontaneous mass emigration to Manchuria, and many of the Japanese who have gone there have gone under government-sponsored schemes. Even the northern island of Hokkaido, less than fifteen hours by train from Tokyo, could support two or three times its present population of just over 3,000,000. In these three instances the Japanese assert that their people do not like going to cold countries, and it is true that in the case of Korea and Manchuria the Japanese peasant finds it difficult to compete with the Korean or with the Chinese. But there has not been even any mass emigration to Formosa whose warm southern climate might be expected admirably to suit the Japanese. To-day, after nearly fifty years of Japanese dominion, there are only 300,000 Japanese in Formosa as against more than 5,260,000 Chinese and tribespeople.

The explanation of this phenomenon is probably to be found in the Japanese temperament. The Japanese peasant does not like opening up new country and, in country that has been already opened up, he cannot compete with the Chinese peasant. The gifts of the ordinary Japanese emigrant are rather those of the small trader, the technician, the *entrepreneur*, the petty official. It is in these professions rather than in that of the pioneer that the peculiar Japanese genius for exploitation can best express itself.

Up to the outbreak of the war with China there was undoubtedly a certain pressure of population inside Japan itself. In innumerable professions work that could quite easily have been done by one man was being done by two or three. The driver of a taxi, for example, was always accompanied by a friend who opened the door and received the fare. The country was finding it difficult to absorb students from the universities and the higher schools, always an important element in any population. Among these young men, many of whom had to accept poorly paid white-collar jobs, there was a deep, mute urge towards a richer, wider, more satisfying life.

At the beginning of the China war the slack in the population was soon absorbed into the army, into the war industries, and into civilian jobs on the mainland like those which have been described above as being best suited to the Japanese temperament. Soon Japan began to experience something she had never before experienced in the whole of her history, namely, a shortage of man-power. A typical manifestation of this shortage has been the training of Koreans for jobs of a military and semi-military nature, like the guarding of prisoners of war, which were previously carried out by the Japanese. But, whereas there have been difficulties recently over man-power in Japan, they have never assumed serious proportions.

It is worth noting in passing that up to the outbreak of the war with China the population of Japan was divided almost equally between industry and agriculture. The balance has now shifted, and will continue steadily to shift, towards industry. What effect this will have on the character and spirit of the Japanese it is difficult to predict. The army depended largely on the tough peasant stock of the countryside. Till now Japan has managed to avoid much of the spiritual impoverishment of industrialization, but it will be interesting to see if she can preserve indefinitely in an industrial economy the peculiar virtues which derived originally from a preponderantly agrarian economy.

The role played by increase of population as an underlying cause of Japanese expansion is to my mind important only when considered in conjunction with other factors, such as the Japanese temperament, idealist, emotional, unanalytical, the age-old Japanese military tradition, the sense of uniqueness bred by long isolation, the temperamental susceptibility to patriotic doctrines, and the like. It meant that, confined within a small space, like bees in a hive, were millions of people who could easily be inspired by nationalist ideas if the latter were vigorously propagated. Pressure of population alone did not drive Japan to the invasion of China and the declaration of war on Britain and America. But it played its part in fashion-

ing a national psychosis which made the people ardently desire, or at least accept as necessary, these appeals to arms.

Now let us consider the contention that economic necessity drove Japan to war.

For the last sixty years Japan has been primarily a manufacturing country like Britain. Poor in natural resources herself, and with a population that could absorb only a part of her products, she was dependent upon importing raw materials from foreign sources and then exporting the finished products to foreign markets. It was therefore imperative that in order to maintain her national economy she should remain on friendly terms with powers who provided both her raw materials and her markets.

During the twenties Japanese industry went through a difficult period owing to the depression and the closure of some of her foreign markets. But in spite of these things, the productivity and prosperity of the nation steadily increased. Japan's economic difficulties really date from the invasion of Manchuria. From that time date the huge army budgets and the striving for economic self-sufficiency. From that time dates the general dislocation in Japan's economy. These difficulties were in the first place a result, not a cause, of a particular act of conquest. But they then became the cause of further acts of conquest. A vicious circle was started which could only have been broken by a complete change in policy. But gradually so many people became committed to this policy that it was impossible to change it.

Many Japanese in the post-war years genuinely desired to play a part worthy of a great power in the new era of international collaboration. They were proud of their permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations. But, after the invasion of Manchuria, it came as a great shock to them that other powers sitting round a table at Geneva should presume to discuss their actions. The discussions at Geneva, the attitude taken up by the rest of the world, the findings of the Lytton Commission, and the talk of sanctions, economic or military—

these things caused the utmost indignation in Japan. The extremer nationalists, who from then on began to set the pace for the whole of the people, were confirmed in their belief that only through the use of force could Japan fulfill her destiny of domination in Asia. Therefore, Japan must build up the force required for the task, a huge modern fighting machine, an industry and a people designed and geared to the waging of war. The same thing happened as happened in Germany. Guns were built to secure political ends. But they could only be built at the expense of butter. The people wanted the same amount of butter they had always been accustomed to. Therefore the guns were used to secure more butter, and their use justified by the plea that the people must have butter.

The talk of sanctions at the time of the invasion of Manchuria revealed to all Japanese the extreme vulnerability of Japanese economy, largely dependent as it was both for raw materials and markets on the good will of other countries. The extremists began to feel that this was an intolerable position on grounds both of security and pride. They began to envisage an Asiatic economic bloc in which Japan would have untrammelled access to sources of raw materials and undisputed control of markets. They called this economic bloc the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" or the "New Order in Asia." It was basically an economic program aiming at the furtherance of Japan's strategic position. It was so presented to the people however that many sections sincerely believed it to be also a Utopian scheme to promote the well-being of all east Asiatic peoples.

The fear of future economic competition was an immediate cause of Japan's invasion of China in 1937. During the two previous years China's industry, based on the extreme cheapness of Chinese labor, had progressed so rapidly that Japan saw in this progress a threat to her own economic structure and she decided to strike before it should have gone too far.

The policies of the military extremists and the leaders of "big business" were at first opposed. The latter realized how

steady, despite many difficulties, had been the rising curve of Japanese commercial progress, how much Japan had to gain by remaining on good terms with the rest of the world. The militarists, however, gained the ascendancy, and gradually, as the war in China developed, the gulf between the two groups closed until their policies coincided completely. Big business found itself chained, not unwillingly, to the Japanese war machine.

When Japan's economic difficulties became really acute in the summer of 1942 the cry went up, as it had gone up in Germany, of "encirclement." The impasse which followed inevitably upon the political and economic policies of the government was presented to the people as a deliberate attempt by the white nations to strangle Japan economically. It became possible to convince the people that the declaration of war on the democracies, like the invasion of China four years before, was an act of national self-preservation.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, in my opinion, that economic difficulties were not in the first place a cause of Japanese nationalism, but rather a result.

What then were the true causes? They were manifold and complex. They have been touched on in earlier sections of this book. A small Asiatic people, with certain forms of political organization, certain highly developed traditions, certain strong racial characteristics, happened to emerge on the world stage at a certain moment in world history. It reacted in a certain manner to the world trends of the time like western imperialism and the scientific technology on which that imperialism was based.

An inadequate and unsatisfactory statement. But is there any point in oversimplifying the problem and failing to appreciate the profound complexity of human affairs, especially where nations are concerned? The causes of the present conflict in the East are to be found in things as diverse as the racial make-up of the Japanese, the climate of Japan, the *samurai* tradition, the impact of ancient China and of modern America, the history during the past century of Germany and Russia,

the invention of steam and the spinning jenny and the internal combustion engine and the radio, the chance occurrence of remarkable men who have helped to mold events, like Saigo Takamori, General Araki, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Stamford Raffles, Lenin, Hitler. Any great decision, such as that of Japan's declaration of war in the winter of 1941, is the product of many strands from the past and many strands from the present.

8.

The more striking characteristics of the Japanese have been described incidentally in the preceding pages. But certain of them should be stressed more deeply in order to explain the true nature of the present conflict.

The Japanese are not individualists like the Chinese. As individuals they possess little of the formidable ability which they possess as a community. They possess something of the nature of the bee, which, when detached from the hive, is as helpless as a piece of flesh torn from the body of a living animal. Mediocre in ability as individuals, they have a capacity for collective effort which is truly remarkable, and which is also in marked contrast to the racial genius of the Chinese. There have been certain great individuals in Japanese history who have played a part in molding events. But the vast majority of Japanese who emerge from their fellows emerge as representatives, or as spokesmen, of various groups large or small. There are fifty Japanese generals, for example, who could play the role played today by General Tojo. Japan, the oldest and most thoroughgoing totalitarian state in the world, is yet a state where dictatorship is impossible. There may be dictatorship by a caste, as happened in the days of the Shogunate and as has happened again in recent times, but never the dictatorship of one man.

The ordinary Japanese thinks of himself as a member of a group, whether that group be the family, the school, the society or the nation. He tends to act, not as an individual, but as a member of the group. Decisions are taken by a sort of

“spirit of the group.” Actions, which to western observers may appear unethical, are in Japanese eyes justified by the fact that they are performed in the service of the group.

This group consciousness, which is a key clew to the Japanese character, stems from ancient times. In a society of warring clans the individual could only exist through indentifying himself and his interests completely with those of the clan. In more recent times, with the transference of the object of identification from the smaller unit to the nation, this group consciousness has meant that the Japanese are ideal totalitarian citizens.

Another clew to the Japanese character, and another quality fitting them for life in the totalitarian state, is a preponderance in their character of emotion over intellect. They are not a people who think profoundly, but a people who feel intensely. Lowes Dickinson, writing of the classical Japanese drama, which in form has certain similarities to that of ancient Greece, has observed that it is the drama of Greece, but without Sophocles, without Euripides, and without Aeschylus. The Japanese are the most emotional people in the world. Their approach to every problem tends to be emotional rather than ratiocinative. They usually know, within thirty seconds of meeting a stranger, whether they like him or not, and whether they like him depends largely on whether he likes them. Their reasons tend to be used in the service of emotional or instinctive urges, which is one reason why they often strike the westerner as being irrational and illogical. They possess a tremendous capacity for concentration but lack the flexibility of mind of the Chinese. This is one reason why they have little facility in learning foreign languages, for languages cannot be learned only by concentration. They have an ant-like capacity for amassing what will be of use to the group. Each unit in the group brings his own little quota of ability or experience or knowledge, with the result that the sum total of ability or experience or knowledge at the disposal of the group is out of all proportion to the endowments of the component units.

The Japanese are a nation of idealists. It is impossible to

understand the present conflict without understanding a little of Japanese idealism. In writing about Japan's rise to power and her present aspirations, it is difficult for the westerner not to portray her people as a race of crafty schemers, urged irresistibly forward by a lust for power, exploiting every world situation to their own advantage, plotting the downfall of other nations in a ruthless furtherance of their own position. The Japanese, on the other hand, see themselves in quite another light. Many Japanese are deeply and sincerely convinced of the fundamental altruism of the order which they are trying to bring about in the Far East. Ever since they first emerged on the world scene, after their long years of isolation, they have been deeply convinced of their sense of mission. They feel that it is their country's mission to lead other nations, in the paths of justice and enlightenment. If now that task of leadership is confined to the peoples of Asia, there have never been wanting Japanese to assert Japan's claim to the leadership of the whole world. The dreamers may perhaps have been few in number, but their dreams have always met with unreserved acceptance by the body of the people. This sense of mission, like that proclaimed by Nazi Germany, cannot be explained purely on economic grounds. Its causes are old and complex. But of its reality, and of the part which it has played in Japanese expansion, there can be no doubt. To the Japanese people the wars against China and against Britain and America have had the spiritual stimulus of crusades of liberation; in the case of China, liberation from misguided leaders who were under Anglo-Saxon domination and working against the true interests of the Chinese people, in the case of the other peoples of Asia, liberation from the shackles of western imperialism. The war in China has often been described in the Japanese press as a "Holy War." Many sections of the people have genuinely felt and believed it to be a "Holy War."

It may be asked whether the Japanese are a religious people. None who has sensed the extraordinary atmosphere of reverence that permeates the great Shinto shrines at Ize or Izumuo,

or watched the expressions on the faces of pilgrims to the Buddhist temples, or penetrated the interior of a *Zen* monastery, or read of the loyalty of the early Catholic converts to their faith during the long era of persecution of the Tokugawa Shogunate, would deny off-hand that the Japanese are capable of the deepest religious feeling. But here again there is a danger of simplifying something that is really very complex and of trying to confine into a paragraph a subject that can only be dealt with in a long book. Nevertheless it must be emphasized that many of the functions of religion as we know it in the West are fulfilled in Japan by patriotism. Religion tries to satisfy two demands in man's nature: his demand for an explanation of the purpose of the universe and of man's part in it, and his demand for an ethic by which to live. For the ordinary Japanese these two demands are largely satisfied by his concept of country. The "greatness" of Japan, her "uniqueness," her "mysterious significance," her "glorious destiny," these things are self-evident facts which are accepted with no more questioning than the warmth of the sun or the change of the seasons. State Shinto, the official patriotic cult, exists over and above Buddhism and Christianity and the personal forms of Shinto. Ancient tradition and modern universal education confirm the Japanese in his acceptance of these premises in regard to his country. His part in the universe, he feels, is to serve his country and to promote her greatness. That which promotes his country's greatness is good, that which does not promote it is bad. It is a simple ethic, but he finds it satisfying. In the service of his country, no sacrifice is too great. His passionate emotional idealism gives him a capacity for sacrifice which in the West is often, somewhat misleadingly, labelled "fanaticism." The Japanese does not give his life so willingly because he believes that by so doing he will be the first to enter paradise. He has little interest in the world after the grave, and has few philosophic conceptions about the after-world. He gives it because he believes passionately that it is his *duty* to do so. Any sacrifice, even the supreme sacrifice, is joyfully accepted if it

brings nearer the fulfillment of the mystical destiny of *Dai Nippon*, "Great Japan," than which, he feels, nothing in the world or in the universe is greater.

9.

So far this essay has dealt mainly with Japan. I wish now to make two digressions, the first to describe some recent developments in China, the second to discuss briefly the part played by the western nations in the Far East.

It is difficult not to think of Japanese history in terms of an upward rising curve, a gradual climb to greatness. China, on the other hand, has always been great, since the dawn of recorded history. She is great today, despite the disasters which have befallen her. She will always be great. She can never be anything else. The vast size of her country, a continent rather than a country; her huge population of over 430,000,000 people, by far the largest homogeneous racial group in the world; the remarkable endowments of her people, their capacity for original thought and artistic creation, their toughness of fiber and their industry, their resourcefulness and quickness of mind—these things ensure the greatness of China. (I am here using the word "greatness" in a somewhat general way. It is often misleading to picture the lives of nations in terms of curves and cycles, since the zenith in one department of a nation's life may coincide with the nadir in another. Goethe and Beethoven, for example, lived in an age of German political and military weakness. Renascent militarist Germany, on the other hand, has so far produced few writers or artists of any account.)

The characteristics of the Chinese, and the sources of China's strength and weakness, derive in large measure from her enormous size. Her millions of people inhabiting an area the size of Europe, have always had three bonds of unity: a common culture; a common written language, despite differences in dialect; and, broadly speaking, a common appearance,

although there is a marked difference between the short, lively, progressive southerner from Canton, and the tall, stolid, more conservative northerner from Peking. In one way China's size has been a source of enormous strength to her. No country that was not as decentralized as China could have withstood the shocks that China has had to endure—a complete blockade of her coastline, the loss of all her main rail and river communications, the loss of all her main cities and industrial areas, the occupation by the enemy of enormous slices of her territory, the secession of traitors who have thrown in their lot with the enemy. Like some vast submarine growth China is an organism that continues to live no matter what parts are removed or damaged. Her powers of recovery, based as they are upon a primarily agrarian economy and upon the energy and ability of her huge population, are immense. There is no country in the world which could have withstood the misfortunes which have befallen China and yet preserved a national existence. No country in the world will be able to recover from such misfortunes more quickly. From these inherent powers of recuperation may be derived in the present darkness a ray of hope for the future. Given peace, given a measure of freedom to evolve her own institutions and preserve her own values by herself and not at the dictation of a foreign power, the outward traces of the present conflict will be wiped from the face of China within the space of two years.

In another way China's size has been a source of great weakness to her. So large was she that in olden times Chinese in one province would look upon Chinese from another province in the same way that the inhabitants of one country in Europe would look upon the inhabitants of another country. Some early European travelers record that their presence did not excite undue curiosity among the Chinese, who were quite ready to believe that in one of the remoter provinces of their Empire there dwelt men with blue eyes and fair hair. There grew up in China during the centuries a code of ethics which stressed loyalty, not to the clan as in Japan, still less to the province or

the nation, but loyalty to the family. This state of affairs was changing before the present war with Japan, and had indeed been in process of change ever since the impact of the West in the last century. Already in the nineteen-thirties China was finding a new unity and a new national consciousness. The war with Japan has merely accelerated developments which were already in existence. The recent history of China has been the substitution of larger for lesser loyalties. Because, until very recent times, there was no national consciousness, there were frequent periods of chaos, none worse than the period which elapsed between the collapse of the Manchu Empire in 1911 and the establishment of a strong central government at Nanking under Chiang Kai-shek in 1932. The chief sufferer in China in both civil and foreign wars is always the unfortunate peasant. Japan, in the summer of 1937, hoped to take advantage of this age-old tendency on the part of China towards disunity. But it is one of the ironies of war that it so often achieves very different ends from those its begetters intend it to achieve. Japan has been the means of China finding a unity such as she had never known before. The bond that began to unite all sections of the people, all interests, was a common hatred of the enemy. In the face of the alien invader, political differences had to be sunk in order to maintain a united front. The Kuomintang and the communists, after several years of bloody strife, came together. However strained their relations may sometimes have been, there is still no open break between them, after more than five years of national resistance.

In other ways, too, the Japanese invasion brought new unity to China. The war set on foot the biggest migrations which the present century has seen anywhere in the world. Refugees from the coastal and riverine areas which the Japanese occupied poured inland, trekking thousands of miles across China to the more inland provinces, the very provinces which had formerly been most provincial in their outlook. Peasants in the interior began to realize that they belonged to something bigger than

the village or the town or the province. They belonged to China. The need for Chinese from different parts of China to communicate with each other inevitably made for a disappearance of the old differences in dialect. The same thing has happened in the case of education. Nearly all the seats of higher education were situated in the areas which the Japanese occupied. Many of them managed, however, in the face of unimaginable difficulties and hardships, to set up new schools and colleges in the interior. Education in Free China has had to contend with appalling difficulties. But the war has made the masses of the people realize the need and the desirability of education. It has brought about a nation-wide thirst for instruction, which is a far more important development than the erection of any number of schools and colleges. The westerner who goes to China today expecting to find a largely illiterate people will be pleasantly surprised. He will come across so many people, simple people like farmers and rickshaw pullers, who, even if they cannot read a newspaper, know sufficient characters to read the headlines in the newspaper, or some patriotic slogan, or an address written down on a piece of paper. In their commenting on foreign affairs the newspapers of Chungking do not compare badly with those of London or New York. The people talk with surprising knowledge and intelligence about what is happening in the world outside China.

Because also, until recent times, there was no national consciousness and because loyalty to the family was stressed above all other loyalties, there was a constant temptation to the individual to indulge in graft and peculation, especially in the exercise of public office. The ambitious young Chinese set out in the world to make what he could for himself and his family. Corruption in officials has always been strongly condemned by Chinese moralists and philosophers. But it was a natural outcome of the concept of loyalty to the family that officials should often plunder treasuries and divert public funds if thereby they could promote the interests of themselves, their families and their dependents. Only a blind optimist would

maintain that speculation, and all its associated vices, have disappeared from present-day China. But many detached western observers who have lived in China for many years say that the curve towards public probity is moving steadily in an upwards direction. Patriotic young Chinese are intolerant of the old methods and want methods which are both morally preferable and make for increased efficiency. Above all the substitution of national for family loyalty is bound to make for higher standards of public duty.

There are many westerners who take a gloomy view of the future of China, who maintain that China's new-found unity is due only to the pressure of the Japanese invasion; that, if this pressure were to be removed, there would be nothing ahead of China but a decade of bloody civil strife; that the Chinese incapacity for collective effort is as ingrained a national characteristic as the capacity for collective effort of the Japanese. It is difficult to foresee the future, but it is impossible to doubt the fact of this increased national awareness of the Chinese people. No nation that has discovered this awareness will willingly submit to alien rule, or alien direction imposed by force. There can be no reversal of such a process, no return to the old limited horizon of village or province. This awareness is the biggest problem that confronts the Japanese. Ironically, it is the Japanese who have been chiefly responsible for bringing it into being. A similar problem confronts the Nazis in Europe. People like the Czechs and the Poles and the Norwegians and the Dutch and the Greeks, who have achieved national awareness and tasted the privileges of self-government, will never willingly submit, any more than will the Chinese, to alien rule. There can be no return from the increased national awareness which has characterized the recent history of all nations in the world whether in Europe or Asia. There can only be evolution towards an even wider awareness, a substitution of still larger for large loyalties, so that the concept of national sovereignty becomes merged in the concept of membership of an even bigger unit.

It is difficult to free our minds from the many associations of the term "Western Imperialism." Japan proclaims that it is her historic mission to free all Asia from the bonds of "Western Imperialism" and liberate the unfortunate peoples who are groaning and sweating under the white man's yoke. In the minds of leftist intellectuals the term connotes political repression and economic exploitation. It is important to free our minds from moral predispositions and to see western imperialism in Asia, not automatically as a blight which descended on the East, but as an important phase in the development of relations between the western and eastern peoples. It is more important to understand its causes and assess its results than to pass judgment upon it.

(I propose to omit India from this discussion, but shall include Burma, whose people have very strong Mongoloid affinities, making their country a sort of buffer between the civilizations of India and China. I have never visited India, and am not competent to speak about its problems, whose true complexity, I often feel, is usually oversimplified by those who talk about them. At the same time I feel that anything said about the past, present or future relations of the western powers with the peoples of eastern Asia applies broadly to their relations with the peoples of India.)

From earliest times there has been intercourse between Europe and Asia. It is possible to distinguish very arbitrarily three phases in this intercourse, the first being marked by the camel as the chief vehicle of intercourse, the second by the ocean-going sailing-ship, the third by the steamer. The fourth will probably be marked by the airplane.

China is separated from the west by the lofty mountain ranges and immense plateaus of central Asia. In early times these tended to cut her off from the west and they were responsible for the remarkable originality of Chinese culture. But at an early stage foreign strands are to be found in Chinese cul-

ture. In the curio shops of Peking the westerner may suddenly come across a piece of sculpture or statuary which he might think had been chiseled in ancient Persia. As early as the Han dynasty two thousand years ago a Chinese embassy reached the Persian Gulf. Along the caravan routes of central Asia percolated, first the tenets of Buddhism, later the art forms of the Hellenistic world, later still Christianity. The famous Nestorian Tablet records, both in Chinese and Syriac, the arrival of a Christian mission at a Chinese court towards the end of the seventh century. Syrian missionaries penetrated the farthest recesses of the Asiatic mainland. Marco Polo, in the thirteenth century, records that he saw Nestorian churches all along the overland trade route from Bagdad to Peking.

In the second phase the chief vehicle of intercourse was the sailing ship as developed by the maritime powers of western Europe. First were the Portuguese. In 1511 Albuquerque conquered Malacca for Portugal; in 1542 three Portuguese seamen reached Japan; in 1557 the Portuguese were permitted by a Chinese emperor to occupy Macao, where they remain to this day. Then came the Spaniards. In 1519 Magellan, a Portuguese who had taken service under the King of Spain, sailed from Spain and the following year reached the Philippine Islands; other ships from his fleet reached Amboyna and Spaniards for a time occupied the Molucca Islands. They were closely followed by the British and the Dutch. In 1579 Sir Francis Drake arrived in the Indies, British traders began to be active in the East, and in 1600 a royal charter was granted to the East India Company. In 1602 the Dutch East India Company was incorporated; in 1606 the Dutch concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Johore; in 1609 the first Dutch Governor-General of the Indies was appointed; in 1619 a capital was founded at Batavia. At first the Portuguese and the Spanish, later the British and the Dutch, were the chief commercial rivals in Asia.

The ancient port of Malacca provides a case history. In 1511 it was conquered by the Portuguese, in 1641 conquered

by the Dutch from the Portuguese, in 1795 conquered by the British from the Dutch, in 1818 restored to the Dutch, in 1824 exchanged for Bencoolen and other British trading-posts in Sumatra, in 1942 conquered by the Japanese from the British. Or take the checkered history of the island of Formosa. In the 16th century both the Portuguese and the Spanish established small settlements on the island, in 1624 the Dutch expelled them and built a fort on the west coast, in 1661 the Manchus under the famous general Koxinga expelled the Dutch, in 1858 the Chinese Government was forced to open two Formosan ports to foreign trade by the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin, in 1874 the Japanese occupied the island for a time in reprisal for the murder of the crew of a Japanese ship by Formosan aborigines, in 1885 the French occupied Keelung during a war with the Chinese, in 1895 the island was ceded to Japan after the first Sino-Japanese war.

In this second phase of the relations between Europe and Asia the intercourse was almost wholly commercial. Expeditions were carried out under the aegis of private enterprise although that enterprise often received royal patronage and state encouragement. Colonies were not yet regarded as an indispensable part of national prestige. The colonists were out for wealth, not prestige. Commercial enterprise was accompanied, and often preceded, by fervent Catholic missionary endeavor. We have already noted the part played by early Catholic missionaries in Japan. They played an equally important part in China also. At the end of the seventeenth century, for example, Jesuit fathers at the court of the Manchu Emperors in Peking were placed in charge of the Bureau of Astronomy. Later they were charged with the task of mapping the Empire, which at its height in the next century included Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet, Turkistan, Ili, and the various tributary states of Korea, Burma, Siam and Indo-China. The Jesuits produced those amazingly accurate and extraordinarily beautiful maps which are one of the wonders of cartography. The missionaries, quite as much as the merchants, were a means of

spreading knowledge about Europe among Asiatics and about Asia among Europeans.

The third phase in the relations of the western powers with the peoples of Asia was merely a very great intensification of the second. The Japanese during the past year have brought it to a dramatic close. This intensification was caused chiefly by technological developments in the West. These created an urge for new markets and new sources of raw materials. They helped to create a militant form of expansionist nationalism which came to regard overseas possessions as desirable adjuncts of national prestige. Technological developments in the military sphere made easy the acquisition of such overseas possessions, for against the musket, the warship and the cannon, the primitive armaments of the East could offer but feeble resistance.

By the end of the last century both China and Japan had been compelled by force of arms to open their ports to foreign trade and to permit the residence of foreign nationals. Britain had occupied the island of Hong Kong; had secured concessions at Tientsin, Wei-hai-wei, Hankow and Canton; had, from three small trading-posts (of which the island of Singapore was nearly uninhabited when purchased in 1819), extended her control over the native states of the Malay Peninsula; and had occupied all Burma in the course of two brief wars. The United States had forced Spain to cede the Philippine Islands. Russia had occupied south Manchuria and established Port Arthur as an ice-free base on the Pacific littoral. France had occupied Indo-China and the port of Kwangchowan in south China, and had secured concessions at Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton. Holland possessed a marvelously rich colonial empire in the Malay archipelago. Portugal retained her outposts at Macao and Timor. Germany had occupied Kiaochow Bay, with its city of Tsingtao, in north China; had occupied part of New Guinea and the islands to its northeast; had secured concessions at Tientsin and Hankow; and had bought from America the Caroline Islands and the smaller of the Mariana

Islands, which had formerly been occupied by Spain. Belgium and Italy both had concessions at Tientsin.

Japan was the only country in Asia which preserved its independence through its own exertions. China was enabled to preserve a nominal independence only through the rivalry of the western powers. Similarly the Siamese, whose powers of national self-preservation were no greater than those of the Burmese or the Annamites, were enabled to preserve their independence only through Anglo-French colonial rivalry.

There was an ugly side to this third phase in the relations between Europe and Asia. The spectacle of the western powers jockeying and intriguing for spheres of influence in China was not an enlightening one. The British record is stained by the early opium trade, on which was founded the wealth of many of the big British merchant houses in the East, and by an act of unmitigated vandalism in the burning of the Summer Palace in Peking by British troops in 1860. But the impact of the West brought benefits as well as sufferings to the peoples of Asia. In any case, it was an inevitable process.

The peoples of Asia reacted to the impact of the West in different ways. At one end of the scale were the Japanese who westernized themselves and proceeded to play the western powers at their own game. At the other end were the simple, pacific, less-developed peoples of Indo-China, Burma and Malaysia who preserved their old ways of life and accepted without undue struggle an alien administration. The Chinese, in their reactions to the West, stood midway between the Japanese on the one hand and the Malaysians on the other. China's vastness complicated the problem. The conflicts caused by the impact of the West, the pangs of adaptation, were keener in China, and brought about more distress than in any other country in eastern Asia.

Three main developments ensued from the activity of the western powers in Asia. Firstly, the West brought certain material benefits. In the case of China, for example, the age-old

scourges of Chinese life were the recurrent evils of plague, famine and flood. Western technology, in the form of modern medicine, railways and engineering, have shown the Chinese the way to the banishing of these scourges. The economic development of Asiatic countries under the leadership of the Europeans did not take place entirely at the expense of the native inhabitants. Commercial intercourse enriched both parties. Chinese as well as British millionaires began to live in spacious houses in Shanghai and Hong Kong. In regions like the Dutch East Indies or the Philippines or Burma, the peace conferred by an alien administration and the starting of educational, medical and social services made possible for the individual a far richer, more varied, more secure life.

Secondly, the western nations in the last century brought with them the doctrines of liberal democracy. Inevitably these doctrines took root, at first only among the intellectuals, but from the intellectuals they began to spread downwards among the masses of the people. As their mental horizons widened, Chinese gradually became more conscious of being Chinese, Filipinos of being Filipinos, Burmans of being Burmans. The presence of alien rulers, so different in every way, intensified their feeling of distinctiveness. In the north they saw an Asiatic people, not unlike themselves, who had preserved their independence and had indeed successfully challenged the power of these seemingly all-mighty white races. Why should they not govern themselves? Why should they too not be independent?

Thirdly, the supremacy of the white man, and the special status which he claimed, were bound to beget a reaction towards him. Today Japan's main rallying-cry in her war in Asia, "Out with the white man," is a cry which in every country in Asia is bound to meet with a certain measure of response, in some countries more than in others.

Pan-Asiatic doctrines, such as those propagated by Japan, have a purely negative foundation—that of expelling the white man. Once he has been expelled the peoples of Asia have infinitely less to unite them than have the peoples of Europe.

To a limited extent it is permissible to talk about "Europe," because, until recently, Europe did enjoy a certain measure of unity in her cultural and artistic life. But it is not really permissible to talk about "Asia" in contradistinction to "Europe"; Asia is threefold, perhaps even fourfold if we include Islam. The differences between the civilizations of India, China and Japan are quite as deep as the differences between any one of them and the civilization of Europe.

If I may make a purely personal digression, my own experiences as a financier may shed a little light on this problem of "Western Imperialism." For two years I represented in China a British corporation which financed the construction of 2,000 miles of railways in China. This corporation had an investment of roughly 15,000,000 pounds, of which, at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, more than half was still outstanding. The railways were built by British engineers with British materials and then staffed in the key posts with British officials. The cost was repaid by the Chinese Government, over a period of thirty to forty years. Leftist intellectuals might describe this as one of the most pernicious forms of "Western Imperialism." It is true that a fairly high rate of interest was charged on the loans. It is true that the British Government in the early days often exerted considerable diplomatic pressure upon the Chinese in the solution of problems which arose. But it is also true that China could have obtained her railways in no other way. Forty years ago she did not have the materials or the engineering skill either to build or operate railways herself. And it is also true that the construction of these railways brought great benefits to the Chinese people. They enabled the Chinese, as emphasized above, to deal with evils like famine and flood, which used to claim millions of lives. They facilitated an exchange of goods, thus enriching many sections of the population. After the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle, they were the main source of revenue to the government. They enabled the Chinese to learn how to build and operate railways themselves, things which they can now do with perfect com-

petence. In my opinion it is difficult to condemn out of hand as pernicious a form of enterprise such as that outlined above, dating from the neap-tide of "Western Imperialism" in China, which brought such benefits to the Chinese people and which contained such sources of enrichment to all parties concerned.

{ PART II }

I.

AN ATTEMPT HAS been made, very inadequately, to answer the question—how did the conflict in the Far East arise and what is its true nature? I shall now try to answer a second question which is of far more urgent concern to the Allied nations—how is Japan to be defeated? It is, of course, a question which an observer, without military training, without access to the innermost councils of the Allied nations, cannot hope to answer adequately. Nevertheless a survey of recent developments, an appreciation of the enemy as he has revealed himself in fifteen months of warfare, may help to illuminate the problem and clarify our thinking.

In order to refresh the minds of readers in regard to events in the Pacific, I propose to give a chronological list of the more decisive actions. (The dates of some of the actions in which initiative lay with the Japanese may err by one or two days. It is not always clear, from press reports and published official reports, exactly when certain things happened, owing to the practice of presenting certain actions of the enemy as *faits accomplis*. Thus an announcement is made in the form—"the Japanese are now in occupation of Balikpapan"—rather than "the Japanese landed at Balikpapan on a certain day.") Allied successes will be printed in italics to illustrate the gradual improvement in the Allied position.

DECEMBER 7, 1941. The Japanese fleet attacks Pearl Harbor. Airplanes operating from carriers, together with submarines, sink or severely damage five battleships, one target-ship, three destroyers, one mine-layer and one large floating dock. They temporarily disable every battleship and most of the aircraft in the Hawaiian area; they put out of action many other combatant and auxiliary vessels;

they damage many shore facilities, especially army air bases. It is estimated that the Japanese use a total of only 105 machines—dive-bombers, high-altitude bombers, torpedo-carrying planes, and a few fighters. The Americans claim to have shot down 48 planes and sunk three submarines.

The United States fleet is virtually eliminated from the opening stages of the Pacific war.

Japanese bombers make raids on Manila, Singapore and Hong Kong.

Japanese forces land at Kota Bahru in northeastern Malaya.

At Midway American marines repel Japanese attempts to effect a landing.

At Shanghai Japanese forces take over control of the International Settlement, and sink the British gunboat *Petrel*.

DECEMBER 8. Japanese forces cross into Thailand from French Indo-China and advance towards Bangkok. For a few hours they are resisted by Thai troops.

Transports disembark other Japanese forces on the Kra Isthmus at Singora and Patani. These points become the main Japanese rear bases for the invasion of Malaya.

Attack on Hong Kong by land and air begins.

DECEMBER 9. Japanese forces occupy the northern Gilbert Islands, 1800 miles southwest of Hawaii.

Japanese forces make a peaceful entry into Bangkok, capital of Thailand.

Japanese forces land on Luzon in Philippine Islands.

DECEMBER 10. Japanese torpedo-carrying planes sink *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* and thereby eliminate the British Far Eastern Fleet from the opening stages of the Pacific war.

Japanese forces land on Guam, 700 miles east of Luzon.

DECEMBER 11. Japanese and Thai Governments sign defensive and offensive alliance.

DECEMBER 12. Japanese army lands on South Luzon.

DECEMBER 14. Guam capitulates.

DECEMBER 16. Japanese forces land in Sarawak and on the north coast of Borneo.

DECEMBER 18. Japanese forces land on Hong Kong island.

DECEMBER 20. Japanese army lands on Mindanao in Philippine Islands.

DECEMBER 23. Japanese occupy Wake Island, 2300 miles west of Hawaii.

Japanese bombers raid Rangoon, capital of Burma.

DECEMBER 25. Hong Kong capitulates.

JANUARY 2, 1942. Japanese troops enter Manila, capital of Philippines, and occupy Cavite naval base.

JANUARY 7. Japanese forces land in northern part of Celebes in Netherlands East Indies, and at Tarakan, small island, rich in oil, off northeast coast of Borneo.

JANUARY 11. Japanese forces enter Kuala Lumpur, capital of the Federated Malay States and largest city on the Malayan mainland.

JANUARY 16. Japanese carrier-based planes twice bomb Rabaul, former capital of German New Guinea and key strategic point in the Bismarck Archipelago.

JANUARY 18. Japanese forces occupy Tavoy in south Burma.

Germany, Italy, and Japan sign new military pact.

JANUARY 22. Japanese forces make landings at Rabaul and in northern Solomon Islands. Rabaul later becomes the main Japanese base in the south Pacific.

JANUARY 22 TO FEBRUARY 2. Various engagements in the Macassar Straits (sometimes misleadingly called "The Battle of the Macassar Straits") as Japanese transports, escorted by naval vessels, bring down troops for the occupation and reinforcement of points on south Borneo and south Celebes. Dutch and American bombers and American destroyers claim to have sunk 15 Japanese transports and damaged 22 more.

JANUARY 24. Japanese forces land at Balikpapan, in south Dutch Borneo, and at Kendari, in southeast Celebes. Kendari, already an important Dutch air base, becomes the main Japanese air base in the Indies.

Japanese forces land at Lae, capital of New Guinea.

Thailand declares war on Britain and America.

JANUARY 30. Japanese forces occupy Amboyna, second most important Dutch naval base (after Soerabaya) in the Indies.

FEBRUARY 3. Japanese planes bomb Port Moresby, capital of Papua.

FEBRUARY 9. Japanese forces land at Gasmata on south coast of New Britain.

FEBRUARY 14. Japanese parachutists occupy Palembang, center of the oil-fields in south Sumatra.

FEBRUARY 15. Singapore capitulates.

FEBRUARY 19. Heavy Japanese raid on Darwin in Northern Australia.

FEBRUARY 20. Japanese forces land on Bali, island east of Java, and on Timor, island between Java and the Australian mainland.

FEBRUARY 23. Japanese submarine shells the coast of California.

FEBRUARY 27. Allied and Japanese squadrons clash in the Battle of the Java Sea. Allies lose 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers.

FEBRUARY 28. Japanese forces land at three points on the coast of Java.

MARCH 2. Dutch begin destruction of Soerabaya, largest Dutch naval base in the Indies.

MARCH 3. Japanese raids on Broome and Wyndham on north-west coast of Australia.

MARCH 5. Japanese enter Batavia.

MARCH 8. Japanese troops enter Rangoon, capital of Burma, thus severing Free China's last main line of supply.

MARCH 9. Japanese forces occupy Bandoeng. Organized resistance on Java comes to an end.

American bombers sink or damage at least twenty Japanese war-ships and transports concentrated off Lae and Salamaua apparently preparatory to launching an attack against Port Moresby and completing the occupation of New Guinea. This attack delays for two months the enemy's plans for a southward advance in this area.

MARCH 17. General MacArthur arrives in Australia.

MARCH 20. (Approximately) Japanese forces occupy the Andaman islands in the Indian Ocean.

MARCH 27. General Blamey, with part of A.I.F., returns to Australia from the Middle East.

APRIL 5. Japanese bombers raid Colombo. Twenty-seven are shot down by British Hurricane fighters.

APRIL 6. Japanese bombers raid two ports in Madras Presidency.

APRIL 9. American and Filipino troops on Bataan are overwhelmed by numerically superior Japanese forces.

Announcement made that two British cruisers, *Dorsetshire* and *Cornwall*, have been sunk by Japanese torpedo-carrying planes in the Indian Ocean.

APRIL 11. Announcement made that British aircraft carrier *Hermes* has been sunk in Indian Ocean by Japanese torpedo-carrying planes.

APRIL 13. *American bombers, based on Australia, raid Philippines, using secret airfield on Mindanao.*

APRIL 18. *American medium bombers raid Tokyo, Nagoya and other cities in Japan. This is the first air raid which Japan has ever had.*

APRIL 26. *Announcement made that American troops are now in New Caledonia.*

APRIL 29. Japanese troops enter Lashio, southern terminus of the famous Burma Highway.

MAY 2. Japanese troops enter Mandalay, second city of Burma.

MAY 4. *American Pacific task force finds concentration of Japanese warships in and around Tulagi in south Solomons again apparently preparing for a southward move. It takes them by surprise and sinks or damages twelve Japanese ships.*

MAY 5. Japanese troops cross the Burma-Yunnan border.

MAY 6. Corregidor capitulates.

MAY 7. Japanese occupy Akyab in western Burma, 330 miles from Calcutta.

MAY 7, 8 AND 9. *Battle of the Coral Sea. American carrier-based and land-based aircraft strike at a large Japanese invasion fleet in the Louisiade Archipelago. The Japanese lose 11 vessels sunk and 7 damaged. The Japanese aircraft carrier Hyukaku is sunk and the aircraft carrier Shokaku is left ablaze. The Americans lose the aircraft carrier Lexington. Another Japanese southward advance, probably aiming at the seizure of Port Moresby and the establishment of bases on the Cape York peninsula, and possibly at the occupation of New Caledonia as well, is frustrated. There is no contact between naval units of the two forces.*

MAY 11. Japanese troops enter Tengyueh, main Chinese city of Western Yunnan.

MAY 21. New Japanese offensive opened in Chekiang, apparently to occupy strategic airfields which might be used by American planes.

MAY 30. Japanese submarine attack on Diego Suarez harbor in Madagascar.

JUNE 1. Japanese midget submarines make a daring raid on Sydney harbor. Three are sunk.

JUNE 3. Japanese bombers raid Dutch Harbor in the eastern Aleutians.

JUNE 4. *Battle of Midway. A Japanese attempt to capture this strategic island 1300 miles northwest of Hawaii is decisively frustrated. American carrier-based and land-based aircraft are again strikingly successful. The Japanese losses are claimed to be as follows:*

- 4 aircraft carriers sunk (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu).*
- 2, probably 3, battleships damaged, 1 severely.*
- 2 heavy cruisers sunk, 3 damaged.*
- 1 light cruiser damaged.*
- 3 destroyers sunk, 1 probably sunk.*
- 4 transports or cargo ships hit by bombs or torpedoes and one or more probably sunk.*

As a result of this action the Americans lose the aircraft carrier Yorktown. As in the Coral Sea Battle, there is no contact between warships. It is exclusively air power versus ships.

JUNE 14. Navy Department confirms Japanese claims that landings have been made in the western Aleutian Islands.

JUNE 16. Japanese launch offensive with 100,000 men in Fukien.

JUNE 20. Japanese submarine shells Vancouver Island.

JUNE 27. *American bombers raid Wake Island.*

JUNE 28. *Australian commandos raid Japanese garrison in Salamaua area and kill 60 of enemy.*

JULY 1. *American bombers raid Kendari.*

In China, American bombers raid Hankow.

JULY 6. *American bombers raid Canton.*

JULY 7. China enters upon the 6th year of her war against Japan.

JULY 21. Japanese forces land at Gona on the north coast of Papua and begin to press inland.

JULY 25. Japanese bombers make night raid on Townsville on northeast coast of Australia.

JULY 30. Japanese forces occupy Kai, Aru and Tanimber islands in Arafura Sea to the northwest of Australia.

AUGUST 1. Japanese occupy Kokoda, government station 40 air miles inland from Gona.

AUGUST 7. *An American amphibian force launches a counter-offensive against the south Solomon Islands and establishes positions on Tulagi, Guadalcanal and Malaita.*

AUGUST 16. *It is revealed in Australia that organized Australian and Dutch guerrilla resistance has been in progress on Timor ever since the Japanese landed there.*

AUGUST 17. *American marines make daring commando raid on Makin Island in Gilbert Group.*

AUGUST 26. *Japanese force lands at Milne Bay and tries to seize this strategic Allied position on the southeastern tip of Papua.*

AUGUST 31. *It is announced that the Japanese attempt to seize Milne Bay has been routed and that the area is rapidly being cleared of the enemy.*

SEPTEMBER 15. *Japanese forward elements reach the vicinity of Ioribaiwa, native village only 32 miles by air from Port Moresby.*

SEPTEMBER 30. *Japanese begin to withdraw from their positions near Ioribaiwa.*

OCTOBER 25. *American bombers raid Hong Kong.*

OCTOBER 26. *Heavy engagement off the Solomon Islands in which American planes score:*

6 hits on aircraft carrier of Zuikaku class.

2 hits on another carrier of same class.

2 hits on battleships of Kongo class.

1 hit on another battleship of same class.

5 hits on one cruiser; hits with bombs and torpedoes on one heavy cruiser.

2 hits with torpedoes on another heavy cruiser.

NOVEMBER 3. *Australians enter Kokoda.*

NOVEMBER 10. *American reconnaissance planes observe heavy concentration of Japanese warships, transports and merchantmen in New Britain and northwest Solomons area. Indications are that Japanese are about to launch major assault to recapture the south Solomons.*

NOVEMBER 13-15. *Major naval engagement off Guadalcanal. A Japanese attempt to land a large expedition to recapture the south Solomons is frustrated. American planes and surface units sink:*

1 Japanese battleship.

3 heavy cruisers.

2 light cruisers.

5 destroyers.

8 transports.

They damage:

1 battleship.

6 destroyers.

4 transports or cargo ships.

NOVEMBER 30. Japanese convoy of troop transports escorted by warships approaching Guadalcanal is engaged by American task forces which sink 12 cruisers or large destroyers, 4 destroyers, 2 transports, 1 cargo ship.

DECEMBER 9. Australians occupy Gona.

DECEMBER 15. (Approximately) British forces launch limited counter-offensive against Japanese positions in Western Burma.

JANUARY 3, 1943. Australians and Americans occupy Buna.

JANUARY 19. Australians and Americans occupy Sanananda Point.

JANUARY 30. Japanese forces operating from Salamaua and Mubo in northeast New Guinea try to capture Wau, main Allied base in that area. Some of their troops come within 400 yards of the airfield. The assault is repulsed by Australian troops who kill more than 1,000 enemy troops.

FEBRUARY 1. Japanese evacuate Guadalcanal.

FEBRUARY 14. More than 30 heavy and medium bombers from MacArthur's command launch the heaviest raid yet made on Rabaul, main Japanese base in the south Pacific. They drop more than 50 tons of bombs and 3,500 incendiaries.

MARCH 3-4. Battle of Bismarck Sea. Official statement claims that Japanese convoy of 22 vessels, taking troops and supplies to Lae, is completely destroyed by American and Australian planes. It is officially stated that 15,000 troops "all perished."

2.

Whether Pearl Harbor was a decisive victory for the Japanese, or whether it will go down to history as the greatest blunder which they ever made, it is still too early to determine. It eliminated the United States fleet from the opening stages of the war in the Pacific. On the other hand it brought America into the war with a bang and was a blow to American prestige which effectively dispelled, at least for a time, the old and natural tendency of certain sections of the American people towards isolationism. It simplified the task of President Roosevelt and the administration in Washington by making the issue

absolutely clear-cut. If Japan had attacked only the British and Dutch possessions and taken no action against the United States, the leaders of the then combatant Allied nations might have faced a very difficult period.

Pearl Harbor should not have surprised anyone who remembered the Russo-Japanese war and the sudden surprise attack wherewith the Japanese fleet bottled up most of the units of the Russian Far Eastern fleet in Port Arthur. We talk about the "treachery" of Pearl Harbor. But from the standpoint of military strategy, which sets such value upon the element of surprise, it was a cunning move, well-timed, perfectly planned and perfectly executed, made possible by the most exact intelligence of the American dispositions.

As we glance through the time-table of Japan's first few months of war, we cannot but be struck by the amazing speed and ease with which her armed forces occupied country after country, subdued fortress after fortress. By the end of May her immediate program of conquest had been completed. In six months she had seized the richest colonial area in the world and had secured untrammelled access to the sources of supply of those raw materials which had been the chief weakness in her economy. What a time it must have been in Japan! Victory after victory, Pearl Harbor, the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, the fall of Hong Kong, of Manila, of Singapore, of Rangoon, of Batavia. Can any country in the world's history ever have known such a marvelous succession of victories in such a short space of time?

Several factors enabled Japan to achieve these successes.

Firstly, General Tojo and his colleagues chose a moment to enter the war when Britain was gravely preoccupied elsewhere, when America was unprepared militarily and psychologically, when Russia was so beset upon her western flank that she could be depended upon to remain aloof from the struggle.

Secondly, none of the western powers had paid adequate attention to the defense of their possessions in the East during the years following the last war. The eclipse of British power

in Malaya dates, not from the day of the Japanese invasion, but from the twenties and thirties when our statesmen failed to appreciate the threat that was developing both in Europe and Asia, and failed to take the necessary measures to protect our possessions. If Japan had attacked us at the time of the fall of France, we could only have attempted to defend the island, not the mainland at all. After that date we took energetic measures to reinforce Malaya, but by that time there were three other fronts which had an even greater urgency than Malaya in the life-and-death struggle in which we were engaged—the British Isles, Russia and the Middle East. Such were the demands upon our resources that it was not possible to concentrate in the Pacific the fleets of bombers which could have sunk the Japanese convoys, the squadrons of fighter planes which could have clawed down the Japanese bombers, and the naval concentrations which could have successfully challenged the Japanese fleet.

Thirdly, the western powers made the great mistake of underestimating the formidability of the Japanese armed forces. Especially did we believe that they could not build and operate those complicated machines, like airplanes and aircraft carriers and tanks, on which so much depends in modern warfare. Racial prejudice probably had much to do with our faulty appreciation. There were a few observers who perceived the dangers and gave their governments and peoples timely warning. The most notable of these was the distinguished American ambassador in Tokyo, Mr. Joseph Grew. But, as a broad generalization, it is true to say that we greatly underestimated the abilities of the Japanese.

Fourthly, whereas the Japanese were able to work on interior lines of communication, our own lines were long and hazardous, and shipping was then, as now, the main limiting factor on all Allied operations. Malaya and the Philippines were distant battlefields where small Allied armies fought thousands of miles away from the main reservoirs of manpower and production. Nowhere did the Japanese encounter a truly

national resistance. The indigenous inhabitants of the countries which Japan invaded—the Philippines, Malaya, the Indies, Burma—tended to stand aloof from the conflict. Many of the Filipino troops on Bataan, the Indian troops in Malaya and Burma, the Indonesian troops of the Netherlands East Indies army, fought with heroism and tenacity, as trained and disciplined troops will always fight. But events suggested that a national army like Japan's is at an advantage over those armies which might be termed "colonial armies," armies largely composed of native mercenaries under foreign officers, with a stiffening of foreign units. The advantage is pronounced when the national army has an absolute superiority in equipment, especially in airplanes. The Chinese army has shown what a national army can achieve, even when it suffers from an inferiority in equipment. Only when the Japanese tried to conquer Papua and reconquer the south Solomons did they again encounter a measure of truly national resistance.

Lastly, it must be conceded that the Japanese, in the early stages of their war against the democracies, made few if any mistakes. The strategic plan was grandiose in concept. The timing was excellent. Japan's opponents were weak, her armies could concentrate in the south without any fear of a second front being opened in the rear. The attack had that paramount ingredient of military success—surprise. All the problems that occurred in the various campaigns had long been foreseen and the necessary preparations to cope with them made with the utmost thoroughness. The Japanese commanders had the benefit of the most perfect intelligence and in every country there was a small, but active, fifth column which greatly aided the progress of the armies. A moment was chosen when Japan's numerically limited air force could be certain in each theater of an absolute local superiority. The range of the bombers and fighters kept pace with the progress of the armies so that everywhere Japanese convoys sailed and Japanese armies fought under air cover. If there was one feature during those first few months of war which impressed western military ob-

servers more than any other, it was the perfect integration of the land, sea and air arms. The three arms combined to form a military machine which functioned with the highest degree of precision. The Japanese carried to an even higher pitch of development than the Germans that prime lesson of all modern warfare, namely, the interdependence of modern weapons, the uselessness of any one arm unless it is used in the closest conjunction with the others.

In less than six months, with a comparatively cheap expenditure of human life, the Japanese gained all their immediate territorial objectives. All those areas which had been regarded as essential units of the "Co-Prosperity Sphere" were occupied by the armed forces.

The time was to come, however, when the American fleet, which had only been temporarily eliminated by the disaster of Pearl Harbor, was ready for a second round. The time came also when the strategies and tactics of the Japanese forces were no longer free from error. Like the British and German Commands before them, the Japanese High Command began to make mistakes.

3.

The Japanese occupied Burma, but they did not press forward with an invasion of India. Nor did the Japanese fleet seek out the British fleet in the Indian Ocean and attempt to destroy it. Except for a very few units, the Japanese fleet withdrew from the Bay of Bengal to the Pacific. Most of the air force which had helped the army to occupy Burma was similarly withdrawn east and southeast. A large force of perhaps five divisions was left to garrison Burma, but it seemed that Japan's attention was no longer focused westward at all.

There were probably several reasons for this change of direction in the Japanese thrust. Perhaps the Japanese High Command was deterred by the opening of the monsoon season from attempting any further military operations in Burma or India for the time being. Perhaps they felt that India, torn by bitter

internal dissension, would fall to them like a ripe plum. Perhaps they required time to build up their communications in this area, for there is no doubt that the rapid progress of their armies had strained their lines of communication. At all events they turned their attention to the south. Russia, China, India, none of these presented any threat. But in Australia and New Zealand lay at least a potential threat. Here were large land masses which might one day provide the Allies with springboards for counter-offensives. Here were air bases and harbors from which planes and ships, if they were to arrive in sufficient quantities, could one day take off against the Japanese. Henceforward for several months the main strategical objective of the Japanese High Command was to deny Australia and New Zealand to the Allies as potential bases for counter-offensives. They sought to achieve this objective, not by occupying those bases themselves, for the physical occupation of Australia would have entailed difficulties and problems hardly commensurate with the advantages of such a move. Occupation might come later, for, if the strategical objective could be attained by other means, Australia would also be a ripe plum awaiting the picking. The Japanese sought to achieve this objective by cutting Australia's lines of communication with America and by occupying the islands to the northeast and east of Australia.

Early in March a concentration of Japanese warships, transports and cargo ships assembled in the Huon Gulf off Lae and Salamaua. It was probably the nucleus of a sea-borne expedition aiming at the occupation of all New Guinea. It was not large because New Guinea was so weakly held by the Allies at that time that a large expedition was not necessary. It was discovered by reconnaissance planes and so smashed up by bombers operating from Australia that the whole Japanese program of a southward drive was delayed for two months.

Early in May a much larger concentration of warships, transports and cargo ships assembled in the Solomon Islands and the Louisiade Archipelago off the eastern tip of Papua.

This was a veritable "invasion fleet." We learned afterwards from captured Japanese documents that it was intended for the seizure of Port Moresby and the establishment of Japanese bases on the Cape York peninsula in northern Queensland. This fleet was smashed up in another of the decisive engagements of the Pacific war, the Battle of the Coral Sea, a sea engagement fought entirely in the air between American and Japanese carrier-based and shore-based aircraft. There was no contact between warships at all. Once again the Japanese southward drive was checked. There can be little doubt that if the Japanese had gained their objectives in New Guinea and Queensland, it would have been only a question of time before they tried to establish bases even further south, probably on New Caledonia and New Zealand. The occupation of Moresby and the establishment of bases in northern Queensland would have been important steps in the process of isolating Australia.

Despite this check, the Japanese did not relinquish their plans for a southward drive, but in June they sought to extend their bases further eastward in the central Pacific by trying to seize the American base of Midway Island, 1,300 miles northwest of Hawaii. They tried to conceal their plans by making a feint at the Aleutian Islands and indeed occupied two or three unimportant islands at the western end of the chain. But Admiral Nimitz correctly diagnosed and anticipated the Japanese plans. The outcome was the Battle of Midway, to date the most far-reaching blow which the Allies have dealt the Japanese in the Pacific. The Japanese lost no less than four aircraft carriers, those vessels which in modern warfare, especially in the Pacific, are even more important than battleships. As in the Battle of the Coral Sea the naval units of the opposing fleets never fired a shot at each other.

Throughout this period of preoccupation in the central and north Pacific, the Japanese continued to make preparations for a resumption of their southward drive. Their new plan entailed three distinct but co-ordinated operations. Firstly, an overland drive on Moresby from the northeast, probably in-

tended to be purely diversionary and to distract the Moresby garrison in its rear. Secondly, the occupation of Milne Bay, that strategic point at the southeastern tip of New Guinea, whose occupation was necessary to ensure the safety of any Japanese expedition from Rabaul rounding the tip of Papua to come at Moresby from the sea. Thirdly, a sea-borne attack on Moresby. The occupation of New Guinea would be only a prelude to the gradual extension of Japanese bases still further southward.

On July 22 a Japanese force landed at Gona on the north coast of Papua, roughly midway between Lae and Milne Bay, and began to press inland across the Owen Stanley Range. Our Command had depended upon the physical obstacle presented by this range of mountains to act as a defensive barrier against any overland attack on Moresby. Anyone who has seen these mighty jungle-covered mountains, has struggled up the slippery trails which wind from ridge to ridge, has been drenched in the torrential rains which fall upon them, will not feel too disposed to criticize the Command's appreciation of the physical difficulties. What we underestimated were not the physical difficulties of the Owen Stanley Range but the audacity of the Japanese in attempting this overland route and the ingenuity and endurance of our own men in surmounting these difficulties when hard necessity drove them to it. When the Japanese landed at Gona, we had a few patrols on the north coast and one battalion of Australian militia based on Kokoda, a small government station on the northern side of the range, possessing a rough airfield. The patrols, whose chief task was reconnaissance, fell back. The militia met the Japanese near Kokoda and put up a spirited resistance. Although reinforcements of militia were sent up, our troops failed to stem the Japanese advance. Kokoda was occupied at the beginning of August, and during the rest of that month the Japanese pushed us slowly and steadily back towards Port Moresby. They reached a point less than 32 miles as the crow flies from Port

Moresby. But in the meantime there had been developments in other sectors.

On the night of August 26, as part of this big co-ordinated plan, a Japanese force landed north of Milne Bay and began to advance down the coast towards the airfield. Aerial reconnaissance must have revealed to them that we had a landing strip in operation there for they had raided it some time previously and been met by Kittyhawks operating from the strip. The importance of Milne Bay is obvious. If the Japanese had tried to seize Moresby without first neutralizing Milne Bay, their ships would have been within close range of our shore-based aircraft which moreover would have had the benefit of fighter protection. The Japanese, however, underestimated the opposition which they would encounter at Milne Bay and landed a comparatively small force. Two squadrons of Australian-manned Kittyhawks went into action against them and wrought great havoc, especially on their supplies. Thenceforward, the Japanese marines had to fight without the advantage of any proper supply organization in their rear. They met determined opposition both from Australian militia and A.I.F. units. Less than one week later, the whole Milne Bay area was cleared of the enemy and the Japanese had suffered an unqualified defeat.

No one in Australia thought that the Japanese would accept this defeat. Everyone thought that they would soon return, this time in overwhelming strength. This would doubtless have happened had not an American expeditionary force occupied the south Solomons at the beginning of September. This move undoubtedly diverted against the American marines much of the Japanese striking power which would otherwise have been used for operations in New Guinea. The seizure of important points in the south Solomons, including the strategic airfield on Guadalcanal, was effected without difficulty. But the holding of these gains, when the Japanese began to launch their counter-attacks, proved an arduous and bitter task. Japanese planes bombarded the marines by day, Japanese warships shelled

them by night, Japanese reinforcements were sneaked on to Guadalcanal by night in a steady stream. But the marines stood firm, demonstrating what trained and disciplined troops, with a real *esprit de corps*, can achieve in the face of great odds. The small American air force established a decisive qualitative superiority over the enemy, and performed a magnificent job. It was during this protracted holding period in the south Solomons that the American navy inflicted two more important blows against Japanese sea power. In the first, on October 26, American planes damaged 2 Japanese aircraft carriers and 2 battleships. On November 13-15 American planes and warships sank 11 Japanese warships and 8 transports and damaged 11 more vessels. These actions took place in waters off the Solomons.

Meanwhile in Papua Australian forces had succeeded in stemming the Japanese overland drive on Moresby. The situation was first stabilized in the neighborhood of Ioribaiwa and then, after an interval, the Japanese began to withdraw. They realized that they had made a mistake in supposing that their troops could fight their way over the Owen Stanley Range and still be in a fit condition to deliver a knock-out blow on the other side. But, as had always been their practice, they had kept pushing on until they were stopped. Their long line of supply and communication along the Kokoda trail was continuously strafed by Bostons and Beaufighters. Their native carriers whom they had brought from New Britain and the Solomons began to desert. Their soldiers, inadequately fed, began to suffer from malaria and dysentery and general exhaustion. At Ioribaiwa, they first encountered artillery fire and also met tough seasoned troops of the A.I.F. All these factors caused the Japanese Command to order a general withdrawal to the northern side of the range. The Australians began to advance. Although there was little contact with the enemy for many days, the rate of the advance was slow for it was dictated by our ability to keep our troops supplied. The chief problem in the Papuan fighting was always administrative

rather than military. Supplies were dropped by air and carried by long lines of native porters. It was really the latter who made possible the advance over the mountains.

On November 3 the Australians entered Kokoda after some brisk fighting on the northern declivity of the Owen Stanley Range. A few miles further on there was a heavy engagement at Gorare in which many hundreds of Japanese were killed with comparatively few losses to the Australians. One Australian brigade alone counted more than 500 Japanese dead left behind upon the field of battle.

The Japanese withdrawal to their bases on the north coast was accelerated by the tardy discovery that they were threatened in the rear. If the most remarkable achievement of the Papuan campaign from the standpoint of human endurance was the long march of the Australian battalions over the Owen Stanley Range, the most original achievement, that with most pregnant possibilities for the future, was the transportation by air of American battalions to points on the north coast southeast of Buna. It is very easy to make rough landing strips in Papua. The coastal belt is dotted with patches of flat ground, often rather boggy, covered with a tall rank grass called *Kumai*. To make a strip all that is necessary is to pick a suitable patch, cut the grass, and drain it, if necessary, with a few rough ditches. For many weeks previously we had been working on several strips. During the latter half of October and the first half of November American troops were flown in to these air fields with all their equipment. Some units began to advance up the coast towards Buna, on foot and by barge. Others struck inland and marched round the Hydrographers Range. (I had the privilege of accompanying the latter on a three weeks' hike over mountain and through jungle.) At Bofu the latter joined an American battalion which in October had crossed the Owen Stanley Range on foot, taking a route parallel with the Kokoda trail but further to the southeast. The task before these American troops was twofold: to harry the Japanese lines of communication and to occupy their rear

bases. Things however did not go quite according to plan. They rarely do in war, especially in jungle campaigns. The Americans were delayed in their progress by supply and other difficulties. Moreover, the Japanese, waking up suddenly to the danger which threatened them in the rear, fell back with great speed and took up well-chosen positions, which they proceeded to fortify as well as they could, at three points on the north coast—Gona, Sanananda and Buna. The Allied forces then commenced what were really siege operations against these three garrisons. Their liquidation was a long and tiresome business which cost many lives, but the objectives were finally achieved. Gona fell on December 9, Buna on January 3, and Sanananda on January 19.

For a time the Japanese were able to keep their garrisons in the general Buna area supplied by barge and by submarine. When these two lines of supply became impossible, they dropped supplies by plane. But it became clear that these garrisons had been given the task of delaying the Allies as long as possible while the Japanese reinforced their bases on the north and northeast coasts of New Guinea. There was never any attempt at evacuation from the Buna area (except perhaps for some wounded in the early stages who were taken off by barge and submarine). There was never any surrender and several thousand Japanese troops fought to the last man. Meanwhile troops poured into the more northerly bases of Wewak, Madang, Finckhafen, Lae and Salamaua. Certain numbers of troops were also landed at the mouth of the Mambare River and small pockets established at intervals all the way up the coast from the Mambare River to Salamaua. These pockets were probably intended to delay any large-scale northward advance which we might have attempted along the coast.

The next aggressive Japanese move occurred on January 30 when Japanese forces operating from Mubo, south of Salamaua, tried to capture Wau, main Allied base in the gold fields area in northeast New Guinea. It was primarily an attempt to seize a strategic air field which enabled us to main-

tain a force in that area. The Japanese were very nearly successful. Some of their troops reached a point only 400 yards from the air field. But a few days previously, again anticipating the intentions of the enemy, we had flown in reinforcements, and these enabled us to repulse the Japanese attack. All the same it was the narrowest of margins.

On March 3-4 occurred the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. A Japanese convoy from Rabaul, bringing supplies and reinforcements to Lae, was destroyed, our bombers claiming to have sunk the entire convoy of 22 vessels and a total of 15,000 troops.

It will be seen that throughout this period, from the day Japan declared war to the sinking of the Bismarck Sea convoy, in only two instances can the initiative be accurately said to have rested with the Allies, namely, in the occupation of the south Solomons and in the limited counter-offensive which Field Marshal Wavell's forces launched from India. The battles of the Coral Sea, of Midway, of the Solomons Sea and of the Bismarck Sea, the Papuan campaign, the actions at Milne Bay and Wau, these were Allied successes but they were essentially *defensive* successes, in which we frustrated the plans of the enemy and checked further aggressive moves on his part. Even in the Solomons, nearly all the fighting took place, not in the course of the landing operations, but in repelling the Japanese counter-offensives. Even in the Burma counter-offensive, the official communiques from the very beginning took pains not to overemphasize the scale of the operations, and the Japanese recently appear to have regained much of the ground which they lost.

At the time of writing (April 7, 1943), the Allies still do not possess the initiative in the war against Japan. Japan may not be taking the initiative but she still possesses it. Ever since Japan came into the war sixteen months ago, the Allies have been on the defensive. They are on the defensive still, and it looks as if they will have to remain on the defensive until Germany is defeated.

It is worth while examining in greater detail one little phase of this conflict between the Allies and Japan, namely, the Papuan campaign, to see what lessons it has for the future. The Allies learned more during this campaign about the enemy and his strength and weakness than in any other campaign except possibly the fighting in the Solomons.

The chief lesson of the Papuan fighting was a purely human one. Having for a long time underestimated the capabilities of the Japanese soldier, public opinion, after the campaigns in Malaya and elsewhere, tended to go to the other extreme and overestimate his capabilities. The Papuan campaign enabled us to see him in true perspective. Those grand battalions of the A.I.F., the cream of Australia's manhood, with more than two years of hard campaigning in the Middle East behind them, showed that the Japanese soldier is no superman. They proved that resolute white troops, thoroughly trained and physically hardened, can outfight the Japanese even at his own specialty of jungle-fighting. It must not be thought that the Japanese did not fight well. He fought cunningly and tenaciously. His obstinate resistance dispelled the myth that the Japanese soldier cannot fight a rearguard action. He fought an excellent rearguard action, and, when cornered, with his back to the sea, he fought with the desperate ferocity of a wild animal. We should be foolish even now to underestimate the capabilities of the enemy. But the A.I.F. in Papua, and the American Marines in the Solomons, have shown that white troops, when properly trained and hardened, can fight with quite as much obstinacy and bravery as the Japanese and with an even greater degree of intelligence.

The Papuan campaign was not a particularly pleasant little affair. The only other campaign in recent years with which it can be compared is perhaps the Gran Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay. The men of the A.I.F., who had fought in four campaigns, in Libya, Greece, Crete and Syria, were

unanimous in declaring that those campaigns were picnics compared with warfare in the New Guinea jungle. They used to reminisce nostalgically of their campaigning days in the desert. For the American troops, it was as brutal an introduction to the realities of war as troops could possibly have.

There is no need to dwell at too great length on the many bloodinesses of Papua. Sitting in a Melbourne garden, many thousands of miles from the front, sucking at my pipe, full of good food, I find it difficult to recall in their true colors the discomforts of the campaign. Our minds are quick to forget unpleasant things. If we recall them, it is but intellectually, without the emotional connotations which they had at the time.

Certainly the fighting was hard. No quarter was given, none was expected. Few prisoners were taken on either side. We took few prisoners because the Japanese refused ever to surrender. Even when they were in desperate circumstances they fought to the death. Those we took were mostly men who could not fight because they were too sick or too seriously wounded. They were treated well, their wounds were attended to and they were decently fed. They all expected to be killed or tortured as they had always been taught would happen if they were to be captured. They were puzzled when this did not happen. On their side the Japanese took few prisoners, partly because a retreating army rarely takes prisoners, partly because their commissariat was so strained. They did not have enough food to feed even their native porters, who deserted to us in large numbers. Prisoners would have been simply more mouths to feed.

There has been little enough chivalry and decency in the war in Europe. But certain conventions have been honored, those relating to prisoners of war, those relating to honorable surrender. The Duke of Aosta, for example, surrendered with full military honors; it is still possible for a German general to dine with his captor and discuss the battle, as the Duke of Marlborough once placed his coach at the disposal of the general who had fought against him. But the war in Papua was

a war without chivalry, a war without honor. It was a bloody fight to the death, an elemental struggle with only one password—kill or be killed.

Because the Japanese fought to the death, because it was necessary to eliminate by physical force every single Japanese in that area, the campaign was inevitably costly. Because the troops of Japan are capable of fighting with this unyielding spirit, they present a military problem perhaps even more formidable than that presented by the Germans. The Russians appear to have fought in this same spirit. We, too, must acquire something of it if we too are going to be successful in this struggle.

Not only was the actual fighting hard, but all fighting in the jungle imposes a great psychological strain on soldiers. They do not have the same visibility that they have in the desert, or on the fields and plains and hills of Europe. They are fighting blind much of the time. The enemy may be at your side, and, if he remains still, you will not know that he is there. He may be at the top of the tree at whose base you are resting. When you are advancing against him, the first you will know of his presence is a round of tommy-gun fire from a clump of bushes fifteen yards ahead. A British general once said to me in Malaya of the Indian troops under his command—"My men feel that they are fighting with hoods over their eyes." It is the same in New Guinea. No area that our men occupied was ever completely clear of Japanese, ever completely safe, until many days afterwards. Survivors would hide in the tops of trees or lie concealed in the long grass. If they still had a gun and some ammunition, they would wait until they could snipe at some solitary passer-by.

Our men fought and lived, therefore, in a permanent state of nervous tension, perhaps largely unconscious, engendered by their never being quite sure where the enemy was, where he might be. In addition to a strong heart and a strong body jungle warfare demands the strongest nerves.

A minor psychological factor in Papua was the remoteness

and isolation of the battlefield. The troops felt terribly cut off from the civilized world. They had to fight for weeks and months without ever seeing anything but the jungle and leaking bivouacs and rain and hard rations. There were no rest-camps, no towns and cities, behind the lines, as there had been in the Middle East. Australia and America felt, as indeed they were, many thousands of miles away. The troops had a certain difficulty in relating this peculiarly grim ordeal of theirs to the global war. Hence an intense and almost pathetic demand for news of the outside world, not so much news of their homes, but news of the other battle-fronts. The Command sought to fill this need by a small daily newspaper printed in Moresby and flown to the forward areas. A war correspondent was asked incessantly for news of Russia and Africa and the Solomons, although his information usually was as limited as anyone else's.

The hardness of the fighting was accentuated by the hardness of the conditions of living. In the Owen Stanleys it would begin to rain regularly about three o'clock in the afternoon. Rain would pour down, most of the evening, much of the night. Our men would lie on ground sheets, with gas capes stretched above them to keep the rain from beating directly on to their bodies. But these did not keep them dry. The men who were holding positions in the front line could not even put up gas capes. They just had to lie in the pouring rain.

On the north coast, when we began siege operations against the Japanese garrisons, our men dug shallow rifle pits. When it rained, as it did quite frequently, the pits filled up with water. The men would lie half submerged. It was nevertheless a curious phenomenon that, although the troops were almost continuously wet, either from rain, sweat or swamp-water, there were practically no cases of colds or sore throats or pneumonia.

In the mountains it was chilly at night. Round Myola a man really required three blankets if he was to keep warm. The troops had to make do with one. On the low coastal belt, it was warmer at night. Shortly before dawn there was that cold

nip that one gets in the tropics. But men could sleep in their clothes without waking up every few hours shivering.

Food was simple. In the mountains there was rarely enough of it. The men ate bully-beef and hard biscuits for weeks on end. Occasionally there was dried apple or apricot. When they reached Kokoda a bar of chocolate was issued to each man.

In the mountains the food was almost always cold. There was so little dry fuel that it took hours to light a fire. Furthermore, anywhere in the forward areas the smoke from a fire would betray our positions to the enemy. Once we descended into the coastal belt the food situation began to improve. The men began to get hot meals brought up from the rear, and hot sugared tea. A certain number of bales of rice were captured from the enemy and our men began to appreciate what a filling and sustaining food rice can be. The tinned C Ration of the American troops, equivalent to the bully-beef and biscuits of the Australians, was occasionally issued to the latter and provided a welcome change. The Americans on the other hand, much as they liked their own emergency D Ration which consists of a single solid bar of chocolate, came to like the Australian emergency ration, a shallow tin containing dried meat which can be eaten dry or made into an appetizing stew, a bar of dried fruit, and tablets of dried milk. By the end of December a certain amount of bread was being flown up to the Buna sector each day, chiefly for the sick and wounded in the rear hospitals. By that time the diet of the troops had improved greatly as regards quantity, quality and variety.

Sickness presented a grave problem. New Guinea, like the south Solomons, like any of these islands in the tropics, is extremely malarial in the valleys and on the coastal plains. Mosquitoes are not found in the mountains, and in the Owen Stanleys there is no malaria. But as soon as our men descended into the coastal belt they became infected. The number of men who were killed or wounded was far surpassed by the number of men who had to come out of the line because of malaria, dengue and scrub typhus. The first two diseases are caused by

the mosquito, scrub typhus by the bite of a tick. Even among our troops who had been on garrison duty at Milne Bay, there was a heavy toll of malaria. There we had taken elaborate precautionary measures against malaria. Quinine was issued regularly and sergeants charged to see that all the men took it. Mosquito nets were used and men charged to see that each mosquito net was properly tucked up at night. No shorts might be worn, no sleeves might be rolled up, after darkness fell. If there was a heavy toll at a place where we had been at leisure to institute really elaborate anti-malarial measures, it may be imagined how much heavier the toll was in an area where it was difficult to institute any anti-malarial measures at all. Troops who are fighting day and night cannot be expected to remember to take their quinine regularly. When you are a hundred yards away from a Japanese pill-box, crouching in a shallow trench, you cannot erect a mosquito-net. Furthermore, quinine only has a suppressive action. After a few weeks of fighting and living in the sort of terrain that is found in north Papua, the resistance of the men becomes so low that they fall easy victims to disease. They do not have the reserves of strength to fight it off. Because of this lowering of resistance, and also because of the dirt and humidity, scratches and sore places become easily infected. The men used to suffer greatly from an irritation round the ankles called scrub-itch. Sandflies near the shore were even more irritating than mosquitoes. Any little sore place would collect its sac of yellow pus. Men would often be covered with these tropical sores and ulcers, some small, some large. They did not always spread, but they would never heal until the man was evacuated to a more salubrious area.

White troops cannot fight under such conditions for more than a limited period. They have to be taken out and fresh troops brought in. Thus an operation which in a healthier climate would require one division will require three divisions in New Guinea. The same thing applies to any of the islands of the south Pacific, like New Britain, or Java, or Borneo. It applies, with perhaps only small modifications, to the areas

like Burma, Malaya, French Indo-China or the Philippines, against which the Allies will one day launch counter-offensives. In all these areas the medical problem will be grave. The loss of effectives through disease and exhaustion will be great.

Thus the reserves of manpower of any attacking troops will have to be considerable. But it must be remembered that exactly the same problems confront the enemy. Some of the Japanese who fell into our hands were wan emaciated wrecks, men in the last stages of exhaustion and malaria. On the other hand, Japanese medical equipment which we captured was of excellent quality, and they had plentiful supplies both of quinine and atebrin. In Java they now have access to more than 90 per cent of the world's supply of chinchona, the tree of Brazilian origin from which quinine is derived. There was nothing in the Papuan campaign to suggest that the Japanese fared either better or worse than did the white troops in regard to malaria and tropical diseases.

Dysentery was another complaint which afflicted our troops. It was so universal that it should not be included under the heading of disease. It was more than a disease. It was a condition of life. The most surprised man I ever saw in Papua was an Australian medical officer on the Sanananda front when a soldier came in to see him one morning and asked for a laxative. The man was apologetic—"I know you won't believe me, Doc, but I want a No. 9."

While on this subject, it is worth remarking that the Japanese appeared to pay little attention to hygiene. It was a curious thing, for in their own country they are a scrupulously clean people. Their troops seemed to have no hesitation in fouling their trenches and the ground round them. I have already described the almost incredible conditions, largely unnecessary, under which they fought at Gona. It would have been quite easy to dispose of many of the corpses which lay about that piece of ground. Knowing as I do the cleanly habits of the Japanese in their own country, I have found no explanation for the squalor which they tolerated in Papua.

The toughness of the physical obstacles of the Papuan campaign demonstrated the need for a very high degree of fitness. To fight in that sort of country, men must be trained hard. It is no place for old men, or physical weaklings, or men with superfluous fat on them. Not only must the men be trained hard, but they must be trained, as are the Japanese, for the special conditions which they will meet in the jungle. Thus, in any training schedule, there should be plenty of night work, so that the men become accustomed to moving and working in the darkness, so that they do not start at every queer noise which they hear at night. There should be an emphasis on individual training, so that the individual soldier becomes independent and self-reliant. There should be plenty of work in country as similar to the tropical jungle of the south Pacific islands as can be found. There should be plenty of marches, not route marches in column along concrete roads, but cross-country treks, in which small bodies of men are told to make their way across difficult country as best they can to some map reference point. There should be instruction in the flora of the jungle: what fruits and roots and herbs are edible, what saplings can best be used for making bivouacs, what vines and creepers make the best cords. There should be as much work as possible with live ammunition, so that the men learn to distinguish between the reports of various weapons. When an untrained soldier first hears a loud crack in the jungle, he rarely knows what it is; whether it is an enemy or Allied rifle, a mortar shell being fired or bursting; he usually thinks that he himself is being fired at, and he will feel a strong urge to hurl himself on the ground. Although both for desert and jungle fighting, the basic military training must be the same, these different types of terrain present very different problems and troops who are going to fight in them should be trained accordingly.

It is the same thing with equipment. A completely different equipment is required in the jungle from what is required in the desert or in Europe. It was interesting in Papua to see how

the best features of the Australian and American equipment gradually acquired universal acceptance. Australian boots proved stronger than American boots. American canvas gaiters, on the other hand, proved so useful that they were also issued to the Australians. The Australians used to envy the Americans the Lister bags, containing several gallons of chlorinated water, which hung in all installations behind the lines. The Americans envied the Australians the iron dixies which used to take hot meals and tea up to the men in the front line twice and sometimes three times a day. And so forth. Through hard experience we learned what was best suited to the conditions. As they lay in their improvised shelters, men pondered how best a combined tent-ground-sheet-mosquito-net could solve the housing problem in the jungle.

I came away from New Guinea with an interest in training which I had never had before. In the past it always bored me. The Papuan campaign made me realize its tremendous importance. But I also came away with the conviction that there is no substitute for the real thing; that true experience has to be bought, often at great cost, under actual conditions; that it is only in the face of enemy fire that the true leaders emerge, and the goats distinguish themselves from the sheep. If, when in the field, one can forget for a time the appalling suffering of war, it is a fascinating study to note the different and often surprising reactions of various psychological types. So often the effeminate little man turns out to possess an unsuspected capacity for courage. So many of the heroic deeds I came across were performed by quiet shy reserved men.

At last, I think, we are learning the lessons of jungle fighting, of warfare against the Japanese, are incorporating them into our training. Certainly in the southwest Pacific, which is the only theater of which I can speak with assurance, we are applying them vigorously.

We should have learned all these lessons after the Malayan and Javan and Burman campaigns. The democracies seem to be slow in applying what they have learned. They prefer the

hard way, of trial and error and costly experience. But they do eventually learn their lessons.

The heights of courage and endurance to which our own men could rise, the tremendous problems of disease in the tropics, the need for physical and mental toughness, the importance of hard training and suitable equipment—these were some of the lessons of the Papuan campaign. But they were not the only lessons.

5.

When General MacArthur after the conclusion of the Papuan campaign was asked to make a statement on the lessons of the campaign, he declared that "the outstanding military lesson of this campaign was the continuous, calculated application of air power, inherent in the potentialities of every component of the air forces, employed in the most intimate tactical and logistical union with ground troops. . . . A new form of campaign was tested which points the way to the ultimate defeat of the enemy in the Pacific. The offensive and defensive power of the air and the adaptability, range and capacity of its transport in effective combination with ground forces, represent tactical and strategical elements of a broadened conception of warfare that will permit the application of offensive power in swift, massive strokes rather than the dilatory and costly island-to-island advance that some have assumed to be necessary in a theater where the enemy's far-flung strongholds are dispersed through a vast expanse of archipelagos. The air forces and ground forces were welded together in Papua, and when in sufficient strength, with proper naval support, their indissoluble union points the way to victory through new and broadened strategic and tactical conceptions."

There is no doubt that the air arm played a very big part in the Papuan campaign. The Beaufighters and Bostons which strafed the Kokoda trail were a contributing factor, perhaps a major factor, in making the Japanese decide to withdraw

from Ioribaiwa. As the Australians advanced over the Owen Stanley Range supplies were dropped to them from American transport planes. All the American troops and the later Australian replacements and reinforcements were flown in to landing strips on the north coast. Australian twenty-five-pounders and their crews were transported by air and played a big part in helping to liquidate the Japanese positions. The thousands of sick and wounded were evacuated to Moresby by air. The forces on the Gona and Sanananda sectors, and to a large extent those in the Buna sector also, were supplied from the air. Transport planes landed supplies of every description on the rough landing strips, and, when it was too boggy for the planes to land, dropped them. Allied reconnaissance planes ranged for hundreds of miles and enabled our bombing and attack planes to cause grave interference to the only two large-scale attempts which the enemy made to land reinforcements in northeast New Guinea during this period—once at the mouth of the Mambare River, once at Lae. Patrols of Kittyhawks, Airacobras and Lightnings kept ceaseless watch on the north Papuan coast. There were not enough of them to neutralize the enemy air force completely. But they limited his activities to a very small number of sorties. Mention must also be made of the old Wirraways, and their gallant Australian pilots and gunners, which acted as forward observation posts for our artillery. Round and round over the Japanese positions they circled, at a very low altitude, fired at by enemy anti-aircraft and machine guns, often deliberately drawing their fire in order to pinpoint their positions, and then doing some strafing on their own if a target presented itself. Everyone was full of admiration for these boys. They were a cheering sign in the skies, an emblem of courage, of cool and cocksure daring. One Wirraway, which became mixed up in a Japanese raid, even succeeded in shooting down a Zero.

The air played an important role, but I could not help observing one day at Gona how ineffective the air can be if it is not co-ordinated with the other arms. Our air force put on a

small concentrated blitz against the Japanese garrison which was by then confined to a very small area only a few hundred yards square. One after the other Kittyhawks divebombed the Japanese positions, Flying Fortresses dropped 500-pound demolition and fragmentation and delayed-action bombs, Beau-fighters and Bostons fired many thousands of rounds of machine-gun fire, the Bostons dropped parachute anti-personnel bombs. This attack from the air was supposed to have been followed immediately by an assault by our ground troops. But something went wrong and the assault was very late in getting under way. By that time the Japanese had had time to collect themselves and take up their positions again. The attack made very little progress.

The Papuan campaign demonstrated the importance of the air arm, but it demonstrated still more the interdependence of land, sea and air. Our offensive was weak in one respect, namely, that what should have been ideally an amphibious operation fought on all three elements—land, air and sea—was fought only on the first two. Japanese command of the sea enabled them to keep their garrisons supplied by small boat and submarine long after they were cut off on land. If we had had that command of the sea, we could have shelled the Japanese garrisons from close range from the sea, and very possibly we could have landed small parties of men from barges who would then have attacked the enemy in the rear.

It is worth noting also the important role played by the Papuan natives. We could not have won the campaign without them. The native population of Papua, from 275,000 to 300,000, is not large. The natives are of many different ethnological types, living on the coast and in the mountains, speaking a variety of different dialects. Some are light-skinned, some dark, some have huge fuzzy gollywog mops of hair, some are close-cropped, some have a strikingly Semitic appearance. A form of compulsory native mobilization was instituted in Papua and many hundreds of natives were put to work carrying supplies and stretchers. White men who had had experience

in handling natives were put in charge of them. It was a remarkable sight to see a group of eight or ten natives bringing a wounded Australian back over the Kokoda trail on a rough improvised stretcher made of a blanket and two saplings. Throughout the campaign these stretcher-bearers did a marvelous job. They used to tend their charges with the utmost care and devotion. Many an Australian who was wounded in the initial fighting around Kokoda and in that long rear-guard action back to Ioribaiwa owes his life to those quiet dusky Papuan natives, who carried him by day and took it in turns to sit up with him by night. Then again we depended upon the natives for carrying supplies from the landing strips and dropping grounds up to the forward areas. After we had been in the northern coastal belt for some time, the American engineers, often with native assistance, built rough roads paved with saplings on which jeeps could be driven. It became possible to send supplies up to the forward areas by jeep and to evacuate the sick and wounded in the same way. The natives ceased to be as indispensable as they had been in the early and middle stages of the campaign. By the end of January it was possible to transfer many of these porters to work on the rubber estates of Papua, in order to increase the production of that commodity of which the Allies are now so short. So pressing had been the demand for natives in the early stages of the campaign that even those working on the rubber estates had been conscripted and work had temporarily ceased.

In another way the Papuan natives helped us. American and Australian airmen who baled out over the jungle in remote regions were looked after by the natives in their villages, sometimes for weeks, and then guided back to mission stations.

The natives were well treated. In addition to their wages of two pounds per month, which are being held for them by the Government until the end of the war, they received regular and plentiful supplies of food, two sticks weekly of trade tobacco which they would roll up and smoke wrapped up in newspaper, good medical facilities. They not only worked well

but also, the vast majority of them, very willingly. Their co-operation speaks volumes of praise for the Papuan administration, especially for that great man, one of the greatest native administrators the British Empire has ever had, Sir Hubert Murray.

It speaks praise also for the work done by the missionaries. White men who came to Papua prepared to scoff at the missionaries and their work were unanimous in their admiration and respect. It was interesting to watch the native porters, nearly all of whom were Christians, holding their Sunday morning service in the jungle, singing Motu hymns in excellent harmony, and often in the evening saying their prayers before they turned in for the night.

The Japanese, on the other hand, appear to have treated their native porters very badly. Some they had recruited locally on the north coast, most they had brought over with them from New Britain and the north Solomons. Many of the latter were very dark, as deeply pigmented as African Negroes. The Japanese fed their porters badly. They themselves lived to a large extent on the country and raided the native gardens. They killed pigs and even cut down coconut and betel palms, all of which are articles of wealth to the natives. It was a short-sighted policy, for throughout New Guinea the natives have withdrawn from the villages into the depths of the jungle. The natives of Buna, for example, withdrew from the coast when the Japanese arrived, together with their wives and children and few possessions. Deep in the jungle, in places reached only by devious tracks known to themselves alone, they erected little huts and planted gardens. When the Allies arrived on the scene, these natives came out of hiding and the men joined the porter lines. Nearly all the porters whom the Japanese were employing at the start of the campaign deserted to our side, some in the Owen Stanleys, some round Kokoda, many hundreds of them on the north coast. For weeks they were coming in at the rate of fifty and a hundred a day. Some of them were mere boys who had been press-ganged round Rabaul.

It is too much to expect that the timid pacific inhabitants of the islands of the south Pacific will take up arms against the Japanese when eventually we launch counter-offensives against the Japanese positions in these islands. But if we can gain their good will, and the same degree of co-operation which the Papuan natives gave us, we shall have allies and friends who will be well worth having.

We owe these Papuan natives a lasting debt. It can best be repaid, in my opinion, by giving them vastly increased medical facilities after the war. A new relationship between the white man and the black man in New Guinea was born out of the common endeavor of the Papuan campaign. In any case, I foresee a big future for that part of the world. It is rich in minerals, in gold and metals, even oil. There is nothing that will not grow there—rubber, coffee, tea, chinchona. If the labor problem, which should not be insuperable, can be solved, and if western capital and initiative are forthcoming, the island should become as rich as Java. The vast majority of white men who fought there thought only of the day when they could leave it, but there were a few, more thoughtful than the rest, who perceived the extraordinary beauties of this great tropic isle and its immense possibilities.

6.

The following is a brief appreciation of the general situation in Asia and the Pacific at the time of writing (April 7, 1943). It may of course change considerably even during the next few days.

The Japanese armed forces are nowhere engaged in large-scale operations. Some Chinese figures (dated February 16, 1943) estimated that the Japanese now had available a total of 100 divisions. Of these 33 were stationed in Manchuria and Korea; 32 were stationed in China, including Hong Kong; 11 to 14 were kept in Japan proper; and 24 or 25 were stationed in various Pacific and southern areas, almost twice the

number originally used to conquer them. The disposition of the latter was given as follows:

Burma	6
Thailand	2
Malaya	1½
Indo-China	1½
Java	2
Borneo	1
New Guinea	2½
New Britain	3
Timor	1
Northern Solomon Islands	2
Philippine Islands	1½

These figures, even if not particularly accurate, at any rate give some idea of the rough distribution of the Japanese forces.

The cream of the Japanese army is probably kept in Manchuria, against any emergency which may arise in Siberia. From Russia's point of view, there is nothing to be gained from creating a second front on her eastern flank when she wishes to be free to concentrate all her energies on her western flank. From Japan's point of view, it might be thought, on a superficial appraisal of the situation, that now would be a good moment to attack Russia, at a time when the Russian armies are sorely pressed in the west. Japan will never feel secure until the Russian frontier has been rolled back to the Urals. A Russo-Japanese war, one cannot help feeling, lies in the logic of history. But the military leaders of Japan are well aware that Soviet Russia has always built up her army and made her plans on the assumption that she would have to fight a war on two fronts. The Russians, in the war against Germany (as in the Nomon-han fighting in May, 1939) have revealed themselves as a first-rate fighting nation, unhampered by those organizational weaknesses which were their undoing in the Russo-Japanese war and in the Great War. Furthermore, it is to Japan's interest to see Russia and Nazi Germany fight each other to the point of exhaustion. Japan is not specially keen to

see Germany, any more than Russia, rise to eminence as the paramount military power in Europe. She would like to see Europe torn and weak and exhausted.

Many Japanese divisions are maintained in China, the majority of them being employed on purely garrison duties. There is not much active fighting in progress in China because the armies of Chiang Kai-shek lack the weapons wherewith to fight. Nevertheless, through the guerrilla activity which she organizes and maintains, and through her obdurate refusal to come to terms with Japan, Free China is performing an inestimable service to the Allied cause by keeping a large proportion of the Japanese army occupied in China.

In Burma there is a large Japanese garrison of which certain units are engaged with Field Marshal Wavell's forces on the Indo-Burmese frontier.

On the fourth sector, the wide arc which runs from Rangoon to Truk, there is a considerable force. This arc runs from Rangoon, through the Andaman islands in the Bay of Bengal, along the southern shores of Sumatra and Java, through Timor and the island groups in the Arafura Sea north-west of Australia (the Kai, Tanimber and Aru Islands), along the western and northern littoral of New Guinea, then through New Britain and the northern Solomon Islands, finally swinging north to Truk and the Caroline Islands. In this sector at the present time there is only ground contact on the smallest scale, between patrols in the deltas of the Kumusi and Mambare Rivers and in the neighborhood of Mubo south of Salamaua. The main Japanese rear base for this southern zone of operations is Rabaul, on the northern tip of New Britain.

The Japanese Command in Rabaul directs operations both in the Solomons and New Guinea. These two areas are considered parts of the same operational area from the Japanese point of view. The Allies maintain two Commands. Admiral Halsey has authority over the Solomons, General MacArthur over New Guinea and New Britain.

It can be seen that the present time is one of almost com-

plete military inaction for the Japanese army. It is nowhere engaged against the forces of the Allies in large-scale or even medium-scale operations. The same thing is true of the Japanese air forces. There is an almost complete absence of air activity on the part of the enemy at the present time. Large-scale daylight raids made by the Japanese air force since the start of the war in any sector can be counted almost on the fingers of one hand. It is probable that Japan entered the war without an air force as large as that of some of the western nations; that her losses during the first year, both in planes and pilots, were fairly heavy; that plane production in Japan is limited; and that at the present time she is concentrating on expanding her aircraft industry, on accumulating a big reserve of machines and on training a reserve of pilots. This is the most plausible explanation of the present inactivity.

The Japanese navy has suffered heavier losses in the war against the democracies than either the Japanese army or air force. In engagements off the coasts of the Philippines, in the Macassar Straits and the Java Sea, in the waters to the north of Australia, in the waters of the Aleutian Islands, off Midway, in the Coral Sea, in the Solomons Sea, in the Bismarck Sea—in all these engagements the Japanese navy sustained losses. The cumulative total has not been negligible from Japan's point of view. It would be a mistake to suppose that the balance of naval power in the Pacific has been changed in our favor, or that the striking power of the Japanese fleet is not still extremely formidable. But as a result of these losses the Japanese navy, like the air force, needs a period of rest and repair. The bulk of it appears now to have been withdrawn into Japanese home waters and into the waters round the big naval base of Truk in the Mandated Islands. Like the air force, the fleet is being kept and prepared against the day when it will have to meet the concentrated striking power of the Allied navies.

The Japanese mercantile marine has also sustained considerable losses. At the start of the war it was estimated at ap-

proximately 5,000,000 tons. Mr. Knox, Secretary of the Navy, in a statement in Washington on March 17, estimated its losses to date at between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 tons. In a statement made by General MacArthur's spokesman the following day, it was pointed out that this figure must be placed against an estimated total of 475,000 tons captured or otherwise obtained from neutrals and non-belligerents, and an estimated total of 450,000 tons of new shipping built in Japan since the outbreak of war. The statement continued: "The pressure on Japanese commercial shipping which undoubtedly exists should be attributed not only to these losses but in large measure to the ever-increasing shipping demands required for the consolidation and exploitation of the vast resources of an enormous empire in the southwest Pacific which the enemy has seized. The strain results primarily from the added requirements arising from these new possessions." The statement concluded with a warning against any undue optimism regarding Japan's difficulties over shipping: "On the southwest Pacific front there has been no indication of any lack of commercial shipping. For months, from Rabaul on one flank to Soerabaya on the other, menacing concentrations of shipping have been continually reported by our air reconnaissance. At Rabaul alone over 300,000 tons have been repeatedly noted. Only the great distance of these centers from our air bases has secured them from our air attacks. It would be a grave fallacy to believe that even the heavy destruction which has been caused by our naval and air power has dangerously weakened the enemy's capacity for sea transport inherent in his command of the internal searoutes within the sphere of his overseas operations."

That a considerable strain does exist is shown by frequent statements made over the Japanese radio announcing new ship-building programs and the need for more ships if the riches of the occupied areas are to be realized and made available to the people of Japan. Broadcasts from the Japanese-controlled radio stations at Saigon, Singapore and Batavia have also announced many launchings and building schemes for small

wooden ships in French Indo-China, Malaya and the Indies. These smaller craft are most useful for coastal and inter-island work. Numerous attacks by bombers from MacArthur's Command on luggers, schooners and small craft in the waters to the north of Australia show that the Japanese are already using them in large numbers to keep their numerous garrisons and outposts supplied.

Economically, Japan now controls plentiful sources of raw materials. Since December, 1941 alone she has gained more than 88 per cent of the world's rubber, 54 per cent of the tin, 28 per cent of the rice, 19 per cent of the tungsten, 4.5 per cent of the oil.

In the Indies she has the richest single colonial area in the whole world. Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China, are all rich in raw materials. And not only has Japan gained them, but they are now denied to the Allies. Japan at the present time is the richest *have-nation* in the world. And in the millions of inhabitants of these occupied areas, in addition to the China market which is the greatest single undeveloped market in the world, Japan has a monopoly market whose potentialities are simply unlimited. Furthermore, she now controls an immense reserve of manpower, industrious and docile, which can be turned to developing economic resources or to constructional work for military purposes.

It appears that a shortage of merchant shipping is preventing the full exploitation of these occupied areas. The people of Japan have not as yet benefited to any large extent from these conquests, and in many of the areas there is nothing less than an economic crisis, causing great hardship to the native inhabitants. For example, Japan now has more rubber than she can possibly use. Even if Japanese factories could use it, there are not enough ships to carry it from Malaya and Sumatra to Japan. The millions of Malays and Indians and Chinese who worked on the rubber estates are therefore deprived of their former livelihood. Japan claims to have discovered a means of making oil from rubber and to have started production in

Malaya. In the opinion of Allied experts, such a process, even if practicable, would be absurdly uneconomical, especially for a country which has access to mineral oil. These Japanese claims are probably connected with some scheme for finding employment for the millions of workers on the rubber estates. For the same reason, Japan has announced that Malaya is to be made self-sufficient in rice, that much of the land is to be turned over to rice production. The probability is that many of the rubber estates are reverting to jungle.

The economy of this rich southern region depended upon a world market. It ministered to the economic needs of Europe and America far more than of Asia. The loss of this world market, resulting in a complete dislocation of the economy, is bound to impose hardships on the native populations who were part of this economy. But it must be emphasized at the same time that life in the tropics can be supported without much difficulty. Make a little clearing in the jungle, plant some simple crops and vegetables and fruits, and nobody need starve. There is far less hardship in south Asia than in the overpopulated industrialized areas of occupied Europe.

In regard to oil, a commodity which Japan needed above all others, there is no doubt that the Dutch in the Indies and the British in Burma made a good job of the work of destruction. But it was never expected that the destruction of the wells and the installations would deny oil to the Japanese for more than a certain period. The Japanese may never on their own be able to attain the same peaks of production as did the British and Dutch. But they had oil technicians, men who had learned their job at the wells of Japanese and Russian Sakhalin. These technicians followed in the train of the occupying forces and commenced operations immediately. It is even possible that by the threat of force and blackmail the Japanese have secured the co-operation of a certain number of native and white technicians. One year after their declaration of war, the probability is that the Japanese have as much oil as their armed forces and industries require.

The Japanese people may still be living on hard rations, the inhabitants of the occupied areas may be enduring considerable hardship, the jungle may be creeping in on the rubber plantations, the mighty installations of Palembang and Yenangyaung may still be lying in ruins, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that from the standpoint of prosecuting the war, the economic position of Japan is fairly secure. Even if shipping is the prime limiting factor with them, as it is with the Allies, their maritime lines of communication have not so far been greatly threatened by Allied submarines.

Politically, the past year in the occupied southern regions has been characterized by two things, firstly, by the eradication of all traces of western influence, secondly, by the substitution of Japanese influence. In the political field the Japanese have an easy task before them. There is a certain amount of nationalism among the Filipinos and the Thais and the Burmese, less among the Indonesians and the peoples of Indo-China. The Chinese in these regions, although nationally conscious, are minority groups. There is no doubt that the easy-going life of the tropics, where life is so easily sustained, begets a certain indolence and unambition. Besides, all Asiatic peoples have a respect for force. The military might of Japan is a dominating theme in all propaganda from Japanese and Japanese-controlled radio stations.

There is a further point. Not only do the southern regions present few urgent political problems to the Japanese, but few troops are required to preserve internal order. There is not in the southern regions, as there is in China, the same need for forces to garrison towns and cities, and police lines of communication, and keep the guerrilla menace at bay. Thus the Japanese are free to concentrate their military strength on the perimeter of their conquests. They do not have to worry about threats and disturbances in their rear. There is still possibly some very minor guerrilla activity in the Philippines and southeast Java. It is possible too that the Thais and Burmese will not prove so co-operative when they discover the true nature of their

"liberation," when they awake to a servitude far harsher than anything they ever knew under the white man. But, for the present, only a very small proportion of the Japanese army is needed for police work in the southern regions.

Such is a rough picture of the general situation in east and southeast Asia in the spring of 1943.

7.

The present might be described as a period of inaction for the Japanese armed forces, certainly not one of inactivity. They are working feverishly at the task of consolidating the defense of their newly-won possessions, walling them round with a fortified line which it will be very difficult for the Allies to breach, preparing concentric rings of secondary defense. Night and day they are making landing strips in the jungle, building blast-bays for bombers and fighters, expanding their air bases and ringing them round with satellite fields. Night and day they are improving the facilities of many little undeveloped ports in this southern area, still further extending their knowledge of the channels and reefs and currents which present many difficulties to the navigator. Night and day they are improving the ground installations of their troops, the barracks, radio stations, hospitals, ordnance supplies and so forth. The troops themselves are becoming more used to the terrain and the climate, more immune to the diseases. Patrols are accumulating a fund of geographical and topographical knowledge, are learning those obscure routes and paths through the jungle, are gaining that superiority in local knowledge which is immensely important in jungle fighting.

The Japanese have the great advantage of working on interior lines of communication. Already an elaborate system of airfields enables them to transfer a fleet of bombers from Manchuria to the Indian border within the space of two or three days. Already they are able to fly their fighter planes direct from the factories in Nagoya where they are built to the

bases in New Britain and New Guinea and the Solomons where they will be used. The construction of all these air bases and landing strips on this southern arc enables aerial striking power to be very quickly concentrated. A multiplicity of bases and strips also makes it more difficult for our bombers to put the Japanese air force out of action by wrecking the landing fields.

What is the significance of all this frenzied Japanese activity on the perimeter of their conquests? Is it offensive in character or is it defensive? Or is it both?

Primarily it is an attempt to build a sort of Maginot line against which any Allied counter-offensives will break themselves, an attempt to insulate the strategical and economic area now dominated by Japan. The longer the Japanese have in which to consolidate this area, the harder they will be to evict. In this respect it may be said that time is on the side of the Japanese. Appeals for increased attention to the Pacific front which have been made from time to time both in Australia and the United States have their origin not in a desire to challenge the Allied global strategy and to launch full-scale offensives against Japan, but rather in a conviction that something must be done to delay this process of consolidation before it shall be too late.

In another respect, also, it may be said that time is working on the side of the Japanese. With the passage of time more and more native leaders are bound to throw in their lot with the Japanese, not all through treachery or through hope of gain, but many because they feel they must make the best of a situation and do what they can for their fellow people. When the white men were driven out of the southern regions, the natives on the whole remained amazingly loyal to them. The white men promised that they would soon be back. The natives believed them and stood aloof from the Japanese. But more than a year has passed and there are still no signs of those promises being fulfilled. Memories are short in the tropics.

Secondarily, this activity serves an offensive purpose. If and

when the Japanese High Command decides to launch further offensives against the Allies, the bases for such action will be prepared and waiting and the bases themselves will be strong and fortified against counter-attack.

Does the Japanese High Command contemplate further offensives? We know what their ambitions are. They comprise the entire world. They would like the moon. It is not always easy to read the minds of people like the Japanese, whose mental processes are so different from our own. They have sprung many surprises on us during the past few years and may spring many more. Very possibly, by the time this small work is published, the whole situation in Asia may have changed radically. Large-scale operations may be in progress again.

If I venture an answer to this question, it is with all possible reservations. For I remember all too well how wrong I have sometimes been in the past. Nevertheless, I must confess that I have serious doubts whether Japan now contemplates the invasion of either Australia or India. The difficulties and responsibilities of an occupation of these areas would not be commensurate with the advantages. Besides, if the Japanese have consolidated their line, the Allies have also consolidated their lines. The Allies are very much stronger than they were a year ago. Japan seems to me to be content to hold and seek to keep what she has. She would still like to occupy New Guinea in order to complete that defensive line to the north of Australia. She may, and probably will, launch offensives to the north of Australia to try and occupy all New Guinea and perhaps the southern Solomons as well. But as for an invasion of Australia, what are the riches of this continent, great as they are, to a country that has Java, with seven million spirited white men in one and forty million docile Malaysians in the other?

The present leaders of Japan, in my opinion, while not abandoning their long-term ambitions, are content to look upon Japan's recent conquests as being sufficient for one generation. They hope to be able to repulse any Allied counter-offensives.

Knowing that it is the Allied strategy to concentrate on cleaning up Europe first, they hope that the western nations will be so exhausted and so war-weary by the time that they have finished that task that they will be prepared to make a compromise peace with Japan.

This question of war-weariness after the defeat of Germany strikes me as being a very important one. Mr. Churchill has already assured the Allies that there will be no relaxation of effort until Japan too is defeated. But it is not difficult to imagine that peoples whose gaze has long been focused on Europe may not focus on Asia with the same attention. The problems of the Pacific, many thousands of miles away, will not strike them as being of the same urgency. People who have been living in danger and insecurity for several years will want to have done with these things. Norwegian and Greek and French seamen, for example, now performing an essential and dangerous service, will want only to return to their homes and families in their liberated homelands. There might even be a tendency, especially in America, to represent the war as being a war to regain colonies, an imperialist war of territorial aggrandizement.

The leaders of Japan realize that these tendencies, in greater or less degree, will follow upon the conclusion of hostilities in Europe. They are counting much upon war-weariness among the western nations.

But this war against Japan is not a war to regain colonies. There can be no peace in the world unless the military might of Japan, no less than that of Nazi Germany, is crushed. *A compromise peace in Asia means another war ten years later.* That is the whole burden of this book. Having been away from England so long, I do not know what degree of interest the British have in this struggle in the Pacific. But I have felt an urge to put down what some of the fundamental issues really are, to try and describe something of the tremendous problem with which we are confronted.

It is indeed a tremendous problem. Something of its magnitude has emerged in the preceding pages. But it is a problem not incapable of solution.

It is neither possible nor desirable to give a completely satisfactory answer to the question: how are we going to defeat Japan? The Japanese themselves would dearly like to know the answer. Much will depend on the course of the war in Europe, on the time it takes to defeat Nazi Germany. We cannot doubt that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt are implacable and resolute in their determination to prosecute the war against Japan. We may be sure that the plans of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, who are charged with the global direction of the war, take Japan into consideration quite as much as Germany. A reporter whose job it is to chronicle events in the field, can know little of such plans, such highly secret Allied strategy. But he can appreciate a little of the problem involved, and a clear statement of any problem is always the first step on the way to its solution.

Assuming that the war against Germany does not last too long, assuming that at its conclusion the Allies still possess very considerable armaments, assuming that the will to fight on with undiminished vigor is still there, it should be possible for the Allies to concentrate very considerable striking power in the Pacific. The battleships and aircraft carriers of the United States, Great Britain and France; smaller naval units, transports, tankers and cargo ships from a dozen Allied countries; several hundred submarines; huge fleets of heavy bombers, attack planes, fighters and transports, suddenly released from the European theater; vast armies of trained, battle-hardened, well-equipped men—all these will become available for use against one nation, Japan.

The problem will then present itself of how this mighty striking-power can best be applied? Will India be the best springboard for a great counter-offensive? Will Australia be

the best springboard? Or will counter-offensives from both of these Allied bases form a great pincer movement which will squeeze the Japanese in their southern possessions? Will it be possible to make an attack southward from Alaska and the Aleutian Islands? Will it be possible even to strike straight at the heart of Japan? There is probably no one who knows the answers to these questions. Nor is it profitable to argue in favor of this theater or that theater, this strategy or that strategy. Certain observations, however, may usefully be made.

It may be remarked of the Indian theater, for example, that the reopening of communications with Free China must remain a cardinal objective of the Allies in the war against Japan. If we can establish a channel whereby arms and all the weapons of war in large volume can reach the Chinese armies, the possibilities are enormous. The Chinese have unlimited reserves of manpower and long ago they demonstrated that at certain types of warfare they are extremely proficient. Flying Fortresses, Liberators, Sterlings, Lancasters, with long-range fighter escort, operating from bases on the Chinese mainland, could wreak terrible havoc on the Japanese bases in China and even on the cities and industrial centers of Japan itself. Moreover, if the Allies were to secure bases, say, on the east coast of Indo-China or on the coast of China, they would be in a position to threaten Japan's lines of communication with her southern possessions. It might not then be necessary to take Singapore and Java by frontal assault. In one respect India is more favorably situated as an Allied base than Australia, in that it would be less exclusively dependent upon ocean lines of supply. This might be an important factor if shipping continues to be the chief limiting factor in all military operations. On the other hand, India is unfavorably situated, for, where it is not separated from China by the mighty mountain masses of the Himalayas, there is the natural physical barrier of dense jungle, and great rivers running north and south, and malarial valleys.

If there are two weaknesses in the Japanese armor, the first is shipping and the second is air power.

We should beware, however, right at the beginning, of underestimating Japan's capacities either to build ships or to manufacture airplanes. She has the raw materials, she has shown that she has the technical knowledge, she has the manpower, she has a great capacity for organization. But it is doubtful if she can attain the standards of production of the western nations, and in the case of aircraft, it is doubtful if, left to her own inspirations, she can maintain a high rate of development and invention.

Japan relies upon shipping to keep her garrisons in the southern regions supplied with all the necessities of resistance. Deprived of this means of supply these garrisons would be in a difficult position. If attacked, they would resist, we may be sure, and their liquidation by land operations would cost many lives. The Japanese in Papua showed what desperate men can do, what a formidable resistance they can put up, even when their supply line is cut. But there is bound to be a certain limit on such resistance, a certain weakening of it, when garrisons cannot obtain supplies and reinforcements.

Submarines, if available in large quantities, could probably harry Japan's supply lines effectively, but not enforce a blockade. If hundreds of German submarines cannot prevent supplies reaching England across the Atlantic, it is doubtful if Allied submarines could prevent Japan from sending a certain volume of supplies to her armies in the south.

To ensure the safety of her vital ocean lines of communication, Japan depends upon an outer ring of air bases from which shore-based planes can operate. The Japanese fleet also relies very largely on the protection conferred by this ring of air bases. Sooner or later, if we are to gain a total victory against Japan, the Allied navies will have to sink or gravely incapacitate the Japanese fleet. This is a *sine qua non* of victory in the Pacific. But it is unlikely to be achieved in a purely naval en-

gement, like the Battle of Jutland in the Great War. All the major naval engagements in the Pacific so far have been fought in the air quite as much as on the surface of the ocean. If the Allied navies are to engage the Japanese navy successfully, our own planes, operating either from carriers or our own shore bases, must prevent the enemy from using his air power against us, and they can only do this by sinking his carriers and bombing his land bases into uselessness. If the whole Allied front is to move forward, then the enemy air bases must not only be bombed into uselessness and denied to the enemy, but they must be seized and occupied by our own troops. Once they have been occupied, then our own planes will be able to operate from them, and will be able to give protection to our naval units and cargo ships.

The war in the Pacific is really a struggle for airfields. To seize an enemy air base, several things must be done. Firstly, Allied bombers must be sufficiently numerous to destroy, not only the base itself, but also bases round it, from which enemy fighters would otherwise operate. Even if this denial is only achieved for a limited period, it will probably suffice. If it is only partially achieved, then Allied fighters must be sufficiently numerous to prevent enemy bombers and fighters from interfering with our amphibious operations. Once, however, this denial has been achieved, and it can only be achieved by an overwhelming quantitative and qualitative superiority in planes, it is possible to proceed to the second stage. As soon as complete air superiority, complete air invulnerability, has been established, it becomes possible for cargo ships and transports to leave their bases. It becomes possible for naval units to move into waters which would otherwise be dangerous; it becomes possible for huge transport planes to drop paratroops. The seizure of a Japanese air base from the sea would be no easy task, even with complete air superiority. But without complete air superiority it would be well-nigh impossible. Air superiority would also enable our bombers and attack-planes to assist

amphibious and ground operations by bombing and strafing enemy positions. Once the strategic area is seized and occupied by ground troops, then a perimeter of defense can be established, the position consolidated, the airfield put into operation as an Allied base, the line of communication both by sea and air with the rear base properly protected, and the whole position strengthened until the operation can be repeated again and a further step forward taken.

For the seizure of enemy air bases, one important thing is required—overwhelming air power, to achieve decisive air superiority. Once this overwhelming air power is available, as it will surely be available after the conclusion of hostilities in Europe, then it will be possible to launch effective counter-offensives against the southern arc of Japanese bases.

There has been much muddled talk about the so-called “island-to-island” tactic of attacking Japan. If the Allies are able to break through from the west and establish bases on the China coast and cut Japan’s lines of communication with the southern regions, the strength of Japan’s southern arc will be gravely impaired, but it may still be necessary to seize these southern islands by physical force. If the attempt at such a break-through from India is unsuccessful or only partially successful, it may be necessary for an offensive to be launched from the south. The Allied High Command may decide upon an advance from the south whether there is a simultaneous advance from India or not.

There is nothing wrong with the “island-to-island” tactic as long as it is based upon decisive air superiority, proper naval and maritime support, and hardened, well-trained, well-equipped, resolute troops. The chief thing held against the “island-to-island” tactic is that it is going to cost lives. Of course it will cost lives, many of them, although not as many as in gigantic land grappleings such as have taken place on the western front in the last war and in Russia in this. *There is no short cut to victory in the Pacific.* There was never yet a

war, in the Pacific or anywhere else, which was won without grievous expenditure of human life. Wars are not won by production, or even by machines, but by men.

It is instructive, in connection with this question of "island-hopping," to trace the role played by air power in the war in the Pacific. Japanese planes achieved Pearl Harbor, the most far-reaching action of the early stages of the war. Japanese planes sank *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*. Japanese planes sank *Hermes*, *Cornwall* and *Dorsetshire* in the Indian Ocean. Japanese planes sank the American aircraft carrier *Langley* as she was taking reinforcements of fighter planes to Java. If there was one single factor more than any other which enabled the Japanese to defeat our armies in Malaya, the Philippines, the Indies and Burma, it was their superiority in the air. Japanese convoys sailed, Japanese armies fought, under an air umbrella. In the early stages of the war, the Japanese High Command made very few mistakes. There was a perfect integration of the land, sea and air arms.

If Japan's successes were due in part to a perfect air cover, her defeats without exception have been caused by her failure to secure that air cover. American planes achieved the successes of the Coral Sea, Midway, and the various engagements in the Solomons. American and Australian planes achieved the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. In all these engagements the Japanese Command, whether through arrogance or shortage of aircraft, attempted to send forward warships and merchantmen without first assuring that command of the air. Or take the Papuan campaign. If there had been no Kittyhawk squadrons at Milne Bay to strafe the Japanese and destroy their supplies, the Japanese would almost certainly have been successful. If there had been no attack planes to strafe the Kokoda trail, the Japanese might possibly never have withdrawn from Ioribaiwa. If there had been no American transports, flying in almost complete safety because of our local air superiority, we could never have maintained an army on the north Papuan

coast nor could the American battalions have threatened the Japanese bases from the south. If transport planes had not enabled us to fly reinforcements in to Wau at the end of January, the Japanese would certainly have taken the place. During the fighting in the Solomons, the Americans did not enjoy the same degree of superiority which we enjoyed in Papua, but the small American air force based on Henderson Field established a decisive qualitative superiority, inflicted great losses on the enemy, and played a big part in enabling the ground forces to hold their positions.

The aerial strategy in this war-theater has been to push the bomber line forward. One year ago our heavy bombers were operating from bases on the Australian mainland. Moresby was only a refueling station. Rabaul was as far from our operational bases as Rome is from London. Later, when engineers had built airfields and installations, the heavy bombers were based upon Moresby. The chief strategic objective of the Papuan campaign was the gaining of air bases on the north Papuan coast which would still further increase the range of our bomber and fighter aircraft. At each step forward the striking power of our air force has been doubled. It has been equivalent to doubling the number of planes in this theater.

As General MacArthur expressed it, in a cable to Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, from whom he had received a message of congratulation on the Bismarck Sea engagement: "The infinite possibilities of the strategic application of air power are not yet fully understood. In proper co-ordination it opens up horizons of application which have not yet been explored. Herein lies the way to victory if we have sufficient constructive imagination to seize the opportunity."

The possibilities are indeed unlimited. Air power is capable of playing a far bigger part in the defeat of Japan than in the defeat of Germany. But, as emphasized before, let us beware of thinking that air power alone can win the war in the Pacific. Airplanes cannot take the place of warships and troops. They can only enable, and assist, warships and troops to function. Let

us beware of people who hold out easy short cuts to victory. Let us realize that the struggle is going to be a hard one, that it is a struggle which can and must be won, but a struggle which can only be won by our displaying matchless qualities of determination, courage and sacrifice.

— { PART III } —

I.

MIGHTY AS THE problem before us is, gloomy though the outlook may often appear, I do not doubt of our ability eventually to defeat the armed forces of Japan. It will take time. It will cost lives. But it can be done. What gives me chief food for speculation is not the outcome of the armed struggle, but rather the principles which, after the defeat of Japan, are going to determine our attitude toward the many complex problems of the Far East.

Mr. Eden recently uttered a warning against the drafting of idealistic Utopias. He urged the Allies to concentrate rather on the immediate task in hand, that of building up unity and a spirit of co-operation among themselves. It was a timely warning. There is no perfect academic pattern which the victors will be able to impose upon the post-war world to solve its multiplicity of problems. These Utopias take too little account of the realities of a constantly changing world, of the probable realities of the post-war world. Often they are but pleasant exercises in wishful thinking. Nevertheless, unless a little thought is expended upon these problems now, we may find ourselves, after the defeat of Japan, responsible for a vast area and with no very clear idea in our minds how its problems are going to be tackled.

To a contemplation of these problems we must try to bring not only all the sympathy, but also all the detachment of which we are capable. *Durch Liebe kommt die Erkenntnis.* Anything of any value that we ever learn about other countries comes from friendships with the men and women of those countries, from emotions shared, from ideas exchanged, from experiences undergone. At the same time we must never allow

our emotions to sway our judgments, and must strive constantly, in our thinking about major political and human problems, to preserve a dispassionate and objective outlook.

Japan proclaims that it is her mission to free the Far East from the shackles of that "Western Imperialism" whose nature has been examined on an earlier page. In the brave new world of Japan's creation, the liberated peoples of Asia, under the leadership of Japan, will move forward to a new era of prosperity, enlightenment and social justice.

Japan has a complete program, mapped out to the smallest detail, for the remolding of the Far East. She has called it variously "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" or "The New Order in Asia." This program can best be described by assuming that Japan is left in undisturbed control of the vast area now dominated by her armies. It is not a difficult picture to paint. Not only do we have the explicit statements of Japanese statesmen and thinkers to go upon. But we can see for ourselves what Japan has done in Korea, Manchuria and the occupied areas of China, what she is doing today in the Philippines, Malaya, the Indies and Burma.

Firstly, in the new Asia of Japan's creation, Japanese garrisons would be stationed throughout Asia and the Pacific, from Sakhalin to Salomaua, from Akyab to Truk, from the Aleutian Islands in the north to the Solomon Islands in the south, from the Andaman Islands in the west to the Caroline Islands in the east. Young Japanese called up for their compulsory military service would spend two years with the colors, not only in Japan or Manchuria as hitherto, but at Peking, Shanghai, Hangkow, Nanking, Canton and many other cities in China as well as many points on the China coast; at Manila and Davao in the Philippines; at Hanoi and Saigon in Indo-China; at Rangoon, Mandalay and Lashio in Burma; at Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Penang in Malaya; at Batavia, Soerabaya, Medan, Amboyna, Balikpapan, Koepang, Dilli, in the Indies; at Rabaul, Wewak, Madang, Lae, Kieta in the southern islands. In certain regions native levies would be organized

under Japanese officers to assist in the task of maintaining internal order, similar to the puppet levies already in existence in Manchuria and in the occupied areas of China.

Secondly, air power would be retained exclusively in the hands of the Japanese, although a small associated partner like Thailand might be permitted, for the sake of prestige, to possess a small air force of its own. The long-range bomber would become the new instrument of authority. Chains of airfields running the length and breadth of the area under Japanese control would permit aerial striking power to be swiftly concentrated at any point where there was a possibility of resistance or rebellion.

Thirdly, naval power likewise would be retained exclusively in the hands of the Japanese.

Fourthly, certain regions like Malaya and the Indies would be incorporated into the Japanese Empire and placed under direct Japanese administration, although the Japanese would doubtless seek the co-operation of the native inhabitants in the task of government. In other regions like China, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Indo-China, control would be exercised indirectly through puppet regimes, nominally independent and representative, but in reality owing their existence solely to Japanese power. All opposition to the New Order, whether in the fields of thought or action, would be ruthlessly exterminated by the puppet regimes at the insistence of their Japanese masters. Especially any doctrines smacking of Communism would be relentlessly weeded out.

Fifthly, Japan would assume the supreme economic direction of the bloc and she alone would decide what this country was to manufacture, what that country was to produce. The bloc would be a self-sufficient unit, able (and indeed designed to be able) to exist without any commercial intercourse either with Europe or the Americas. Heavy industries, and all armament industries, would be kept in Japan. Any industry permitted to function in China or elsewhere would be complementary to the industry of Japan. The cotton of China, the rice of Thai-

land, the rubber and tin of Malaya, the oil of the Indies, the timber of Burma—Japan alone would decide in what measure these materials were to be produced and to what countries in Asia they were to be sent. Japan alone would decide in what countries raw materials were to be transformed into manufactured goods, and to what countries in Asia the manufactured goods were then to be exported.

Sixthly, the monetary systems of the new bloc would be unified and controlled by Japan. The currencies of the component units, whether it were the Chinese dollar, the Thai bhaht, the Burmese rupee, the Indo-China piastre, the Philippine peseto, or the Indonesian guilder, would be tied to the yen at fixed rates of exchange and would therefore also have fixed rates of exchange in regard to each other. All banking accounts would be cleared in Tokyo.

Seventhly, there would be a tremendous exodus from Japan of Japanese merchants, technicians, industrialists, *entrepreneurs*, all keen to participate in the economic exploitation of the occupied regions. The power of their country would inevitably give them a special status and specially favorable treatment. There would be a great demand for Japanese officials and advisers to the new puppet regimes. The Japanese government would also try to establish permanent colonies of Japanese settlers at key points such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia and Rabaul in order to consolidate the defense of the new area.

Eighthly, white men would not be permitted to participate in the economic life of Asia. It is possible that the Germans, in return for services rendered, might be permitted a limited participation. Other white peoples would have to compete on terms of complete inequality, not only with the Japanese, but also with the native inhabitants. The British and Americans would in all probability be barred even from entering eastern Asia, let alone making their living there. There would certainly be no British-owned rubber estates and iron mines exporting their rubber and iron to Britain as there used to be

Japanese-owned rubber estates and iron mines in British Malaya exporting their products to Japan.

Ninthly, all education would be rigidly controlled. All instruments of influencing man's thought—the school, the radio, the cinema, the newspaper, the pamphlet, the book—would be devoted toward persuading the peoples of Asia to accept the New Order and participate enthusiastically in it. The leadership and protective benevolence of Japan, the might of the Japanese armed forces, the brotherhood of the peoples of Asia, the wickedness and inferiority of the white races—these would be the dominant themes of education.

Tenthly, the Japanese language would be a compulsory subject in schools throughout Asia. Special schools and language courses would endeavor to substitute Japanese for English as the *lingua franca* of the Far East. Use of the English language would be forbidden and strenuous attempts made to wipe out what traces remain of British and American influence.

These are the salient features of an ambitious, comprehensive and detailed program. Much of it has already been put into practice. Already there are garrisons scattered throughout the area. Burmese levies and Thai troops even fought against the British and Chinese in the Burma campaign. Already there is an adequate system of air bases with chains of fields like ribbons running from one end of the area to the other. Already new administrations, headed by Japanese military governors, under direct military control, have come into being. Large numbers of officials, advisers and technicians have arrived from Japan. Elaborate systems of registration, always dear to the exact minds of the Japanese, have been enforced. New taxation systems have supplanted the old. New police organizations have already acquired an unsavory reputation. Native rulers and leaders and former officials willing to work with the Japanese have been given good jobs. Typical of these men who have chosen to come to terms with the Japanese are the Sultan of Johore in Malaya and Dr. Ba Maw, first premier under the 1937 constitution, in Burma. Other figures like

Wang Ching-wei in occupied China, Admiral Decoux in French Indo-China and Field Marshal Pibul Songgram in Thailand, all head governments which are in effect puppet regimes completely under the control of the Japanese.

Already a start has been made with the economic exploitation of the recently conquered regions. It is taking place under rigid Japanese military supervision and has so far been limited only by the shortage of merchant shipping. Japanese banks have set up branches, Japanese commercial houses have begun operations. The various currencies have been tied to the yen and the old notes gradually replaced with Japanese military script.

Already the educational systems have been drastically overhauled to bring them into line with the New Order. Lower grade schools, and technical schools such as will produce technicians and petty officials and teachers, these have been allowed to function under Japanese direction and supervision. Most of the institutions of higher learning have been closed down. Shinto shrines have been erected at Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Rangoon, Mandalay, Batavia and elsewhere. Numerous Japanese language schools and courses have been started and a vigorous campaign opened to propagate the new language. The English and Dutch names of streets and places have been banned and Japanese or native names substituted. Newspapers and radio stations have become mere organs of Japanese propaganda. All radio sets have to be registered and listening-in to foreign stations is punishable with death. Already some Dutchmen in Java have been shot for this crime. Various political associations, aimed at promoting the New Order, have come into being in every occupied country. Started at Japanese instigation, they function under Japanese direction. Rallies are held, with speeches by Japanese officials and native stooges, processions through the streets, contributions of money to Japanese causes, much flag-waving and brandishing of banners with political slogans—"Down with the White man," "Long live

the New Order in Asia," "Welcome to our Japanese Lib-
erators."

Such is the pattern of life which is being imposed by force
on one-fifth of the human race.

2.

Rational idealists, and virile men who are not prepared
to accept a status of inequality with the Japanese or anyone
else, must reject the Japanese concept of a New Order in
Asia. It must be rejected on several grounds.

Firstly, the creation of three or four self-sufficient economic
blocs, each under the leadership of a militarist power, could
only lead to further war. The blocs would exist primarily to
make the strong militarist powers who head them even stronger.
The same old armaments race would go on, this time between
blocs, not nations, and would have exactly the same old result
—war. Both Germany and Japan have proclaimed their right
ultimately to the hegemony of the whole world. If they
emerged victorious, there would only be an uneasy truce be-
tween them, a period of outward amity and hectic subterranean
preparation, until a bloody clash broke out. The totalitarian
state is a state organized for war. Whether it deliberately
wishes for war or whether it is forced into war by the economic
trends it has deliberately set in motion, the totalitarian state
inevitably goes to war. The bloc is simply an enlargement of
the totalitarian state, different in scale but not in kind. It too
will inevitably go to war. If people are going to think in bloc
terms, they might just as well continue to think in national
terms as they used to do. There is only one alternative in think-
ing in national terms. That alternative is thinking in world
terms.

Secondly, Japan's New Order, based as it would be upon
force, would only beget reaction among the more developed
and virile nations on whom it was imposed. It could be imposed
without undue difficulty upon the Annamites and the Malays

and the Burmese, but not upon more virile races. In the case of these latter peoples, it might be possible, for a time, for a conquering power to impose its will by force. But force only begets reaction, and if reaction cannot express itself in overt resistance, there will be resistance of spirit, a smoldering resentment, upon which no happy or permanent New Order can be based. If any New Order is to last for any time at all, then participation in it must be largely voluntary, not compulsory. It can be imposed, for a time, by force; it can only be sustained by consent. Germany's experience in Europe, Japan's experience in China, are concrete proof of the truth of this assertion. In the Far East the most important participants in any New Order will always be China and Japan. For each country her relations with the other will always be of paramount concern, will always be the chief problem in her dealings with the outside world. Japan has wrung a measure of consent from the Chinese by force. But, after nearly six long years of war, she has achieved very little of that true consent which is freely and spontaneously given on the basis of equality and reciprocity. It is not simply because of the "wicked interference" of Britain and America that Chiang Kai-shek has succeeded in retaining, while Wang Ching-wei has failed to obtain, the loyalty of the vast bulk of the population of China. Any New Order in Asia, if it is to satisfy the more fundamental needs of the peoples concerned, must be based upon a very large measure of free consent.

Thirdly, Japan's New Order in Asia would rest upon a basis of racial inequality and intolerance, implied as between Japan and her Asiatic neighbors, openly expressed as between Japan and the white races. It is not a position which any of the white races could accept. The white peoples have a right to participate in the economic and cultural life of Europe and the Americas. In neither case need participation rest upon political domination or upon an assertion or racial superiority. Indeed it is likely to be vitiated if it does rest upon these things. The use of the term "right to participate" is perhaps misleading.

Rights are only principles which have come to be recognized. It would be more accurate to say that only if the principle of economic participation, equal and reciprocal, is universally acknowledged can the world move forward to a happier future. Japan's New Order denies this principle and provides for a vastly reduced volume of intercourse, in economic, cultural and personal fields, between East and West. It is yet one more denial of a fundamental *fact* which science has brought into being, the fact of the oneness of the modern world and the essential interdependence of its component parts.

The Japanese concept of a New Order in Asia is not without appeal. The dream of a brotherhood of Asiatic peoples—it is easy to understand how this can appeal to ardent young Japanese idealists. We have to admit, also, that it has many elements of soundness, such as the need for economic planning by a supreme directive, the need for the economic lives of Japan and China to be complementary and not competitive. We reject it, however, on the grounds that, although a grandiose concept, it is not grandiose enough; that it would not achieve the ends it sets out to achieve; that it would cause great unhappiness to many millions of people and would eventually lead to war.

We reject it. But what do we, the Allies, have to offer in its stead? Supposing the armed forces of Japan were to be defeated tomorrow, what sort of an order would we try to bring into being? Are we fighting, as our opponents claim we are fighting, simply to restore the *status quo*? In every country in Asia the Japanese have appealed, often with considerable success, to the young dissatisfied few who wanted to end the *status quo*. In the day of victory shall we simply try to recreate the pre-war Asia of twenty years ago, and redraft the map of the Far East to make it conform to the map of 1922? Shall we bottle up inside the Japanese archipelago seventy million able and industrious people, who have tasted the

sweets of power, so that the whole sickening business begins all over again?

The Allies have no program, as have the Japanese, for the future reorganization of the Far East. The lack of any specific programs, both in Europe and Asia, is already a grave handicap to us in the actual waging of this war. It will be an even graver handicap to us after the war. Unless a little thought is devoted to these problems, academic and unreal though they may seem at the moment, there will only be chaos after a decision has been reached on the military plane, chaos leading to a speedy recurrence of those very evils which we are seeking to banish from the world.

3.

Any program for the future reconstruction of the Far East has to start from a few basic facts. If these facts are not acknowledged, then the whole structure will be founded upon an unsound basis and will soon collapse.

Firstly, and most important, is the fact that nations are not static organisms. They are in constant process of change and development. In some the population is steadily growing, causing an increase in the economic needs of the people and pressing harder upon the means of subsistence. In others the population is stationary or decreasing, rendering possible a diminution in the economic and subsistence needs. Some Asiatic peoples have reached a stage of political development in which they can competently govern themselves. Others, if they were suddenly to be given complete control over their own affairs, would relapse into a state of tribal anarchy. Some Asiatic peoples can build and operate railways with western efficiency. Others have not yet reached that stage of technical ability. Nations have always been in a process of change and development, but the rate of change has been enormously accelerated by modern means of communication, which have made possible a pooling of the world's knowledge and have rendered

that knowledge accessible to all. We have to acknowledge the fact of change. What we must try to evolve is *a mechanism of peaceful change*. However carefully and justly we may try to draw the map of the post-war world, it cannot remain unaltered for more than five years. Alterations are bound to occur. We must try to evolve a mechanism whereby they can occur peacefully, without a resort to force. In some ways, perhaps, this illustration is an unfortunate one, for we associate maps with rigid national boundaries, with colonial empires. The map of the new world must be drawn on another basis than that of nationality and empire. There can be no peace in the Far East unless the fact of change is acknowledged.

Secondly, we must acknowledge also the fact that all life is founded upon conflict, whether in personal, spiritual or national spheres. Conflict can no more be eliminated than can the need to eat and drink, or the urge to reproduce. But it is for us, as rational men with control over our own destinies, to decide whether one particular form of conflict, that between large national groups, is going to take the form of exterminatory war or whether it is going to be sublimated into less destructive channels. It is obvious that national rivalry can find a release in other ways than on the bloody field of war. Nations can vie with each other in the rival standards of their national life; in the richness and variety of the cultural life which they can offer to their own citizens and to visitors from afar; in the beauty and glory of their great cities; in the fields of sport, of scientific achievement, of artistic endeavor; and, to a limited extent, in the field of commerce.

Thirdly, to descend to a more earthy level, we have to admit that the privileged status of the white man in the Far East is a thing of the past. It will not return. It is not for us to pronounce judgment on the past, for, if there were many white men who abused their status, there were others who rendered the greatest and most selfless service to the peoples among whom they dwelt. But, for the future, we can say

with assurance that the white man will have to make his way and create a position for himself on his merits and quality alone and by his own unaided efforts, not, as often hitherto, by virtue of the pigmentation of his skin and the warships of his country's navy. It will be the wisdom of every white nation to send to the Far East, not whoever cares to try his luck there, but the ablest and best representatives that nation can produce.

Fourthly, in Asia no less than in Europe there is need for intelligent planning by a supreme world economic directive. Nobody desires a return to the economic chaos of the pre-war world: Osaka undercutting Lancashire and herself being undercut by Shanghai; Shanghai exporting rice from the Yangtze valley to Japan and herself having to import rice from Indo-China; Australia exporting scrap iron to Japan and receiving it back in the form of bombs and shells; Japan importing the bulk of her oil not from the nearest wells in the Indies but from America; Manchuria's agrarian economy being wrecked because it was no longer possible to export its staple crop, the soya bean, to Europe—and all the other absurd spectacles which we have been witnessing during the past few years. I am no economist, and the economic planning of the post-war world is a job for professional economists. For myself I cannot help feeling that each nation should devote itself to producing those goods which it is best fitted by nature to produce. Some nations should be primarily producers of manufactured goods, some producers of wheat or rice or beans, some producers of oil or rubber, some producers of iron or tin, some producers of wool and meat and hides. Each nation would then have something of value to export to the rest of the world. In exchange, it would import those goods which it needed for the maintenance of its economic life. Specialization would not be forced too far, but, for the purposes of international trade, each country would depend upon the large-scale production of two or three basic commodities. If it was found that there was not room in the world for Australian and Chinese industry in

addition to Japanese industry, then I should say that Australia and China should restrain or curtail their industry since both countries possess what Japan does not possess, namely, other products, apart from manufactured articles, which are urgently needed by the rest of the world. If Malaya and Sumatra were beginning to produce more rubber than the world's industry required, then both areas should curtail their production, or, alternatively, one area should concentrate on the production of rubber and the other on the production of some other commodity—tin in Malaya or oil in Sumatra. If India could produce iron more cheaply than it could be produced in Australia but yet was the sole producer of some other material for which there was a world demand, then India should greatly reduce her production of iron. Each country would thus become so dependent upon other countries both for its markets and its imports that it could not afford the luxury of going to war. Interdependence in the economic field would help to draw the bonds tighter in the political, cultural and personal fields.

Economic planning aims at enabling all men to feel free from want and at supplying them with those material goods which science has devised for their comfort and well-being. It aims at an elimination of that cut-throat economic competition which in recent years has been one of the most potent causes of war. But freedom from want and the supply of material goods are not ends in themselves. They are a means to a higher end. They are a means to enabling the ordinary man all over the world to lead a richer, more varied, more cultured, more secure life.

We must ask ourselves continually: in what does a nation's riches consist? In the number of hours a day the people work, or in the satisfaction they derive from their work? In the amount of leisure they have, or in the use to which they put that leisure? In the number of their factories, or in the quality of their schools? In their union-bound factory-workers, or in their independent, self-reliant farmers and herdsmen? In

their rich capitalists, or in their great writers and artists and musicians, who achieve a universal renown and enrich the cultural heritage of the whole world?

Economic planning aims at filling man's primary needs on the material plane so that he will be free to pursue in peace a higher life on the intellectual and spiritual planes. Without economic planning there can be no peace in the post-war world.

Fifthly, the problem of Asia is in many ways more complex than the problem of Europe, because the Asiatic countries are at varying stages of political development. The countries of Europe are more clearly defined national entities, and all have shown that they are able to govern themselves, as far as their internal national life is concerned, with a certain degree of competence. The problem in Asia is exceedingly complex. This complexity can best be appreciated by considering some of the countries concerned.

China, for example, at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, had not yet asserted her full sovereignty. In the Concessions and the International Settlement at Shanghai, foreigners still enjoyed extraterritorial rights. Her chief revenue-collecting services, the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle, were largely staffed in the key posts by foreigners in the employ of the Chinese government. Both extraterritoriality and the presence of foreign officials were incidentally of considerable benefit to China during the war, but the first especially was a slur on her national sovereignty which she has long been anxious to remove. Today, no one can deny that China has now made good her claim to full sovereignty. The Chinese, after nearly six long years of resistance, have asserted their right to a full direction of their own affairs. China will be obliged in the post-war world, as will all other nations, to accept certain limitations on her national sovereignty through submitting to the direction of certain supra-national agencies, especially in the field of economics, but, unless the above right is acknowledged, there can be no lasting peace in the Far East.

Or consider the Philippine Islands. Have not the Filipino

soldiers, who fought side by side with the American forces on the Bataan Peninsula, asserted the right of their people also to full nationhood? That right was acknowledged when the United States promised the Filipinos their independence in 1946. Last year it found signal confirmation in Washington when President Quezon was appointed to represent his country on the Pacific War Council. The epic resistance on Bataan lifted the whole future relations between a small eastern people and a great western people on to a higher plane.

The case of several of the countries of southeastern Asia, whose populations are very mixed, is further complicated by the fact that they are especially rich in those raw materials which are essential to modern industry.

The population of Malaya, for example, is composed of 2,400,000 Chinese, 2,200,000 Malays, and 800,000 Indians. If there were neither Japanese nor white men in Malaya, it would immediately pass into the economic and political control of the Chinese. If there were no Chinese in Malaya, then the Indian immigrants would probably soon acquire control. And yet we regard the Malays as the rightful inhabitants of the country, although the Malays too, several centuries ago, dispossessed yet earlier Negrito inhabitants.

If the peoples of Indo-China were to be left to their own devices, the old petty kingdoms of Annam, Cambodia, Cochinchina, Tonkin, would soon reassert themselves. The Thais would revive their claims to much territory now included in Indo-China.

The Burmese feel that they have as great a right to a direction of their own affairs as their kinsfolk the Thais. But, given this direction, they would immediately begin to persecute unmercifully the million Indians and the half-million Chinese who live within their borders. Furthermore, they do not possess the technical knowledge required to exploit the Burma oil which is needed by the rest of the world.

The peoples of Indonesia attained to a high degree of culture and civilization, but they also, if now left to themselves,

would revert to a condition of disunity, probably of internecine disunity, like the peoples of Indo-China. Like the Burmese, they do not possess the technical ability required to exploit many of the raw materials in which the Indies are so phenomenally rich. Besides, have not the Dutch acquired certain very definite rights in this region, by a residence of three and a half centuries, by a close identification with the life of the people, by their loyalty to the Indonesians during the Japanese invasion? The Dutch officials remained at their posts until the Japanese arrived or retired to the interior and there continued the task of administration. There was no evacuation of Dutch women and civilians from the Indies.

There can be no peace in the Far East unless the full complexity of the problem presented by the varying stages of development of the peoples concerned is realized.

Lastly, in any further reconstruction, there must be outlets provided for the ardor of youthful idealists, whose souls can only be satisfied if they feel that they are working for the betterment and enlightenment of their fellows. There must be outlets for the adventurous spirit of youth. Unless this need is satisfied, vigorous young men, potentially the most valuable element the community possesses, will turn their energies into disruptive and unprofitable channels, as has happened repeatedly during the world's history.

4.

The problem that confronts us, therefore, is to devise machinery whereby, in as full a measure as possible, these needs can be filled and these rights acknowledged.

The first duty that will confront the Allied statesmen after the war will be the need to restrain the desire for revenge that will assert itself in all the victorious countries. If the Allied New Order is going to be founded on revenge, we might as well start preparing immediately for World War Three.

Secondly, it will be necessary to disarm Japan and to take whatever measures are necessary to ensure that her armed forces never go on the rampage in Asia again. There is nothing that can sweeten the bitter pill of defeat for a proud nation. Perhaps it is as well. Perhaps it is only through humiliation that a nation which has come to idolize force and militarism can be made to realize the true implications of these things. There is no immediate solution for a defeated Germany or a defeated Japan. If it has taken years to generate an aggressive militarist national psychology, it will certainly take very much longer, perhaps a hundred years, to generate a saner psychology in its place. The interim is bound to be a bitter and desperately unhappy time for the vanquished. All that the victors can do is to make sure they miss no opportunity of weaning such a defeated nation back into the comity of world powers and that they do their best to remove physical want as a source of unhappiness and a stimulus to aggression.

Thirdly, it will not be difficult to expand the present Grand Alliance, which already comprises the representative governments of twenty-eight countries, into a World Federation which will include not only the governments of countries at present neutral but also, ultimately, the governments of our present opponents.

Fourthly, such a Federation must have, in the background, the physical power whereby it can, if necessary, assert its will over any recalcitrant member whose behavior is deliberately calculated to sabotage the whole structure. This end can best be achieved by the Allies, immediately after the war, imposing compulsory military aerial disarmament on the Axis powers, but retaining their own aerial power and gradually transforming it into a Federated Air Force. Such an instrument of authority would eventually have its personnel based on some sort of proportional representation and would be kept in some remote region like the Middle West of America, as far away as possible from the main problem centers of Europe and Asia. Such a band of picked young men, recruited from every

country in the world, undergoing together the same training and living together for a period of several years, united also by the knight-errantry of the air, might well constitute a microcosm of the unity and brotherhood which would bind their respective nations.

It may be asked: If the Allied New Order is going to be based ultimately on force, in what way is it different from the Axis New Orders? The answer is that the Allies have a clearer conception than the Axis of the forces making for world peace; that the backing of force must be there if required; and that, if ever used, it would be used in the interests of the whole world, not in the interests of a few countries at the expense of many.

The Allied New Order must be founded upon a recognition of the principle of change. It must represent an attempt to enable change to take place in peaceful ways. The League of Nations was a failure because it became a league only of certain nations, those primarily interested in resisting change and maintaining the *status quo*.

Fifthly, as a main agency of such a World Federation, there must be not only a supra-national Air Force, but also a supra-national Board of Economic Planning. Given our modern knowledge of economic forces, given a genuine desire to find a solution and a readiness to make mutual sacrifices in the achievement of a solution, there is no economic problem, as between nations, which cannot be solved by a group of experts sitting round a table. On such a Board a country like Japan would play a very prominent part. Such a Board of Planning must also have the authority, freely given to it by the peoples of the world, to enforce any decisions which might be opposed by one small group but which are nevertheless in the interests of all. Hence the necessity for the presence, in the background, of physical power.

Sixthly, in the case of countries like China and the Philippines, the right must be conceded to them of a full measure of direction of their own affairs. But also, in the case of some

of the less politically developed countries of southeastern Asia, the right must be conceded to the people of other countries to effect an economic development of which the natives are not themselves capable or to which they are by nature disinclined. In an area like the Indies, for example, three distinct but not conflicting interests have to be considered: those of the Indonesians, those of the Dutch, and those of the world's industry. In Malaya four interests have to be considered: those of the Malays, those of the Chinese, those of the Indians, and those of the world's industry. In Burma three interests have to be considered: those of the Burmese, those of the Indian and Chinese minorities, and those of the world's industry. The problem in these countries is to devise machinery which will satisfy as completely as possible the various interests. For myself, I sometimes wonder if it cannot best be achieved by granting these countries a full measure of local autonomy, on a racially representative basis, in their internal, cultural and religious life, and by creating for them an International Civil Service which will supervise and assist in administration and economic development, with, in countries like the Indies and the Philippines, the Dutch and the Americans being granted certain special rights.

Seventhly, the right must be conceded to all peoples to participate, within the limits laid down by a supreme world economic directive, in the economic life of their neighbors, especially in the economic life of the world's less developed areas. The spirit of idealism and of youthful adventure would then be able to express itself in a greater freedom of movement and residence and activity; in participation in a New Order founded on truly world lines; and in membership of the supra-national agencies of such an Order, like the Federated Air Force and the Board of World Economic Planning and the International Civil Service.

But machinery is not enough. We may devise the most perfect machinery and yet, if the will to use it properly is not there, it will prove of no avail. The League of Nations was

in theory a first-rate piece of political machinery, but in practice its members never used it for the purposes for which it was intended. Therefore, lastly, there should be added one further reform, the Internationalization of Higher Education. Instead of six Australian Rhodes Scholars going yearly to Oxford, I should like to see six thousand young Australians in their early twenties going yearly, not only to Britain and America, but to all the countries of Europe and Asia, especially to Asia, there to undergo two or three years of study, residence or employment. In return several thousand young Europeans and Asiatics of the same age would come to Australia to work in university and mine and factory and on the great sheep and cattle stations. It might be objected that any course of study in Japan or China would have to be preceded by two years of intensive language study and that, in any case, Japan and China have little to offer the West compared with what the West has to offer them. To which I should reply that two years of language study are years well spent if they give the learner an insight into a mentality and a culture and a literature completely different from his own but just as rich, just as varied, just as highly developed. Technical and scientific education in the larger universities of the East is today little inferior to that in the universities of the West. Especially in the arts—in painting, in literature, in philosophy, in music, in drama—the East has much of incalculable value to offer to the West.

Furthermore, I should like to see the adoption, by any World Federation, of a universal second language in education, to become a universal means of communication, to play the part that Latin played in the Middle Ages as a common tongue among educated men throughout the civilized European world. The claims of the Chinese and Japanese languages to this exalted role are prejudiced by the complexity of their systems of writing, although both countries have tried to reduce the number of ideographs in common use. Russian, German and French all have claims, but, in my opinion, the claims of English are stronger, not only because English is already a *lingua*

franca over wide stretches of the globe, but also because the cultures of Britain and America have always in the past been marked by that spirit of intellectual tolerance which we desire to see prevail in the post-war world. International amity can only be based upon international understanding. The banishment of international misunderstanding must be a prime function of all future education.

Several years ago, when I was a teacher at a Japanese university in a remote region of Japan, I suffered from some minor ailment of the eyes and daily had to present myself at the hospital for treatment. I would have to take my place in the waiting room of the eye department until my turn arrived. All around me were fellow-sufferers, most of them in far more grievous case than myself, here an old man who was nearly blind, there a small baby at its mother's breast crying from this smart which it could not understand, here a young schoolboy with a patch over one eye, there a peasant from the country with an appalling inflammation round both eyes, here a little wrinkled old woman whose eyes had the glassy film of near-blindness, there a young girl in her gaily colored kimono, who, in order to see, had to peer myopically like an owl awakened in daylight. The spectacle of this suffering, day after day, week after week, affected me deeply. I began to realize how precious are those delicate organs which are the means to such delight, how intense can be the suffering which they cause when afflicted, how tragic is the plight of those who are deprived of their use. I resolved, when my contract at the university should be finished and I had returned to England, to become a qualified oculist and to found a clinic of my own, no matter where, to which poor people could come for relief from suffering. But another idea took shape in my mind during those long hours that I used to sit in the waiting room of the hospital at Sapporo. I resolved to found a Medical Order, somewhat on religious lines, but devoted, not to the service of God, but to the service of Man, which is after all very much the same thing. Young men, with the necessary qualifications, from any

nation in the world, would join it, either for life or for a certain term of years. During their term of membership, they would submit to a quasi-religious discipline, would live a life of considerable austerity, would wear a simple uniform, would work in any part of the world where there was an especial need at the moment for the services of doctors. Such an Order would be international in composition, would give its members not only an unexampled training in discipline and humanity but also in the technique of their profession, would help to reduce the sum total of human suffering, and would help to promote increased understanding between nations and peoples.

Alas! When eventually I returned to England, I found that it would take me at least five years to become a qualified oculist. There were so many other things that I now wanted to do that I grudged devoting five whole years toward equipping myself for a certain task. I abandoned the idea of myself becoming an oculist, but I still feel that the idea of an International Medical Order is one not without elements of usefulness for the future of the world.

5.

From lofty speculations such as these one returns to the brute realities of the present world. One looks through the headlines of the morning paper. Vast Battles in Donets Basin; Allies pound Axis Strongholds in North Africa; Explosion in Naples Kills 400, seriously injures 2,000; More Sinkings in Atlantic; Air Losses in March; Saboteurs at Work in Norway; Crippling Allied Raids on Germany; Fifty Belgians seized as Hostages; More Japanese killed in Papua; Hitler bleeds France of Young Men; Confusion at Algiers; More German Spies rounded up in United States; American Pilot gives Life to save Crew over New Guinea; Japanese claim Capture of Chinese City; Sixty-two Greeks executed by Nazis in Crete; More Persecution of Jews in Poland; and so on. It is one long chronicle of hatred, the intensification of hatred and the

perpetuation of hatred. The morning paper makes one feel that, in thinking about the post-war world and future world organization, one has been daydreaming and indulging in an orgy of wishful thinking.

The biologist may say: "You cannot eliminate war. You cannot eliminate conflict. It is the basic fact of all human development. Peace is not the natural state of the world. There is no peace in Nature. Man is a creature in the zoological series. He has the same instincts as the animals, is subject to the same laws. If you are sensible you will accept the fact of war and the fact of conflict and armor yourself against suffering with a gentle cynicism."

Perhaps indeed the basic fact which we have to acknowledge is that the years of man are threescore and ten, which means that human experience is not a thing that can ever be transmitted from one generation to another. Each generation must make its mistakes and then watch, impotent to counsel or restrain, another generation repeat those same mistakes. In each country revolutionary movements derive their chief stimulus from the men in their twenties, not from those in their fifties.

Perhaps, to an observer on Mars our human conflicts appear no different from those conflicts which take place in the animal and insect world, "the butterfly killed by the swallow, the swallow speared by the shrike," conflicts which we watch without undue emotion and take completely for granted.

The rational man is bound to accept the fact of man's animal nature. But man is distinct from the animals in so far as he is able to control his instincts. An instinct is an automatic response to a certain stimulus. Man alone among the animals has the capability, if he chooses to exercise it, of delaying that response and of deliberately guiding it into channels of his own choosing. It is in our capacity for rational choice that we assert our special status as men. Therefore, as rational men, we do not have to accept the fact of war. War is the rule of nature. It need not be the rule of human intercourse.

Planning for the future, however futile it may seem when

we read the morning paper, is not a complete waste of time. Not only is it our moral duty to strive for the maximum happiness of all mankind. But it is sheer common sense to ponder how best we can eliminate the evils which have vexed the world, in an especially widespread fashion, for the last fifty years. Unless we have that vision in the back of our minds of the goal to which we wish to move, we cannot hope to move toward that goal.

More than eight centuries ago a Japanese poet sang:

*Utsutsu wo mo
Utsutsu to sara-mi
Omowaneba,
Yume wo mo yume to
Nani ka omowamu?*

*Since I am convinced that reality
Is in no way
Real,
How am I to admit
That dreams are dreams?*

